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ABSTRACT 
 
From 1865 to 1920, Thoroughbred horse racing matured in Louisiana, developing into a 
national sport shaped by the processes of modernization, professionalization, and reform. Before 
the onset of the Civil War, the leaders of Southern thoroughbred horse racing came from the 
planter elite who used African-American slave horsemen in shows of “amateur” recreation. 
Combining upper-class recreation with lower and middle-class entertainment, horse racing was a 
performance of social power. The Civil War devastated the Louisiana turf, scattering horses and 
men – but sportsmen proposed that post-war racing would help the state recover. The once-
independent New Orleans turf joined an interconnected network of major tracks as the 
professional turfmen adopted national racing ideals and standards. Thanks to the turfmen’s 
efforts to promote and democratize the sport, New Orleans became the national capital of winter 
racing. 
The professional class leading the Louisiana turf reflected the fusion of gambling-as-
business with a larger organizational transformation that was occurring. The modernization of 
the track brought more lucrative prospects to everyone in racing, including black horsemen and 
professional gamblers. After emancipation, black horsemen prospered on the track; their 
continued success in a meritocratic profession allowed them to earn a significant salary, 
widespread acclaim, and social mobility. But the equality espoused by some of the black 
horsemen troubled white turfmen who then enacted widespread informal policies leading to the 
national subordination and exclusion of African-American jockeys. Emphasizing gambling also 
piqued Progressive and moral reformers seeking to cleanse the tracks of an ostensibly 
undesirable element. The means to reform was uncertain, and a debate between regulation and 
prohibition arose in the Louisiana Legislature. In the end, the legislature passed laws that banned 
vii 
 
racetrack gambling and, effectively, shut down the New Orleans tracks. When Louisiana 
gambling laws were repealed, a decline in public interest meant fewer tracks reopened, leading to 
increased competition for mounts, and no opportunity for black horsemen thanks to Louisiana’s 
solidification of Jim Crow. The convergence of racial ideology, economic interest, and moral 
reform all fundamentally influenced the reemergence and decline of thoroughbred horse racing 
in New Orleans from Reconstruction through the Progressive Era. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Isaac Murphy was the preeminent jockey – black or white – in the United States at the 
close of the nineteenth-century. He won three Kentucky Derbies in the 1880s and 1890s and 
earned substantial fortune and fame for himself. He came to prominence during a time when the 
racetrack had become an important national recreation, as professional sportsmen sought to earn 
social prestige and profit on the turf. These sportsmen successfully used principles of 
modernization and democratization to transform the turf from its pre-modern antebellum roots 
into a network of interconnected national tracks. Sportsmen, turfmen, horsemen, and gamblers 
alike all shared in the profits of the track. The economic changes occurring at the track brought 
with them a lucrative opportunity for skilled black horsemen to earn fame, fortune, and glory. 
Isaac Murphy was the greatest of them and his success “fueled hopes of the coming of a racially 
integrated America, founded on the idea that equality was entailed in the freedom attained at 
emancipation.”1 The hope embodied by the black horsemen struck fear into the hearts of white 
turfmen. Murphy was a victim of the backlash – first, he was discredited through an informal 
smear campaign; then, the economics of the sport dictated the end of his career as horse owners 
were not willing to risk their investments on the chance that Murphy might endanger their 
horses. Through a variety of means between 1890 and 1910, from informal policies within the 
racing institutions, to state political reform and overt violence, the public face of the black 
turfmen – the jockeys – were run off the track. 
Sports journalist Bill Rhoden considers Murphy’s experience to be the progenitor of a 
phenomenon he terms the “Jockey Syndrome,” that is, the “changing of the rules to fit a need – 
                                                 
1
 Katherine C. Mooney, Race Horse Men: How Slavery and Freedom Were Made at the 
Racetrack (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 196. 
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the need to maintain control in the face of a perceived challenge to white supremacy.”2 The 
preeminent riders of the postbellum period were slowly shut out from the sport through a “series 
of maneuvers to facilitate racist outcomes, including the taking away of previously granted rights 
and the diluting of access through coercive power and force.”3 Rhoden argues that the Jockey 
Syndrome has always been at the forefront of the American sports establishment. Whenever 
black athletes found success, the rules of the game were amended, “tilting the ostensibly level 
playing field of sport away from equal opportunity and toward white supremacy.”4  
The elimination of the black jockeys was only one of the major social forces that 
transformed racing in Louisiana after the Civil War. During these years, the modernization of 
horse racing brought about the development of a new middle-class of professional sportsmen 
who, after usurping power from the old planter-aristocracy, democratized the nature of the sport, 
bringing New Orleans racing in line with national standards and reintegrating the city into the 
                                                 
2
 William C. Rhoden, Forty Million Dollar Slaves: The Rise, Fall, and Redemption of the Black 
Athlete (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006), 68.  
 
3
 Rhoden, 68. 
 
4
 Rhoden, 68.; Rhoden later adds that the expected outcomes of these changes haven’t always 
been achieved. In many cases, they completely backfired due to greater innovation by black athletes. One 
example can be found as an addendum to the previous basketball examples. Due to the dominance of 
African-American centers and forwards in professional basketball, the American Basketball Association 
(ABA) instituted the three-point line in 1967 as a way to encourage more white guards. ABA 
Commissioner George Mikan stated that the three-point line “will give the smaller player a chance to 
score and open up the defense to make the game more enjoyable for the fans.” Instead though, the new 
rule led to an influx of African-American long-range shooters. “4-Point Play Gets Approved by ABA,” 
The Miami News, July 11, 1967. 
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American economy.
5
 The ideas of freedom espoused by black horsemen alarmed the white 
turfmen who strengthened their national reunification through the subordination of African-
Americans. The professional sportsmen needed to ensure order and efficiency on the track to 
sustain high profits. The role of the professional sportsman and the centrality of gambling to the 
new Louisiana track generated opposition from two new forces, religious and political reformers, 
together, encompassing two strains of Progressive Era reform. The perception of impropriety and 
dishonesty that was imputed to professional sportsmen and gamblers, along with the racial 
discord and threats to white supremacy following the success of the black horsemen, drew the 
attention of local and national moral reformers. After much debate over the merits of regulation 
versus prohibition, Louisiana outlawed horse racing in 1908, solidifying the newly-redrawn color 
line and restructuring the horse racing infrastructure and racing interests before the tracks 
reopened fully in 1919. A cloud of anxieties enveloped the white middle-class men of New 
Orleans as they tried to navigate their position in the New South, confronting their insecurities 
regarding race, class, and gender in the face of modernity and progress. In examining the debates 
over control of horse racing and American leisure interests in general, this study will reveal the 
convergence of racial ideology, economic interest, and moral reform as the fundamental 
influences on the reemergence and decline of thoroughbred horse racing in New Orleans from 
Reconstruction through the Progressive Era. 
                                                 
5
 The nature of democratization on the turf does not directly give more power to those who were 
not part of the elite. It was a democratization of access, as policies enacted by the professional sportsmen 
sought to attract more people to the track by making it cheaper and more accessible. This did, however, 
confer some measure of influence to the track goers because the jockey clubs were dependent on income 
from gate receipts and gambling money to keep the prize amounts high. More lucrative purses meant that 
the clubs could attract higher-quality stables, and the increased competition would ideally attract more 
people to the track. A decline in attendance, alternatively, leads to a decline in purse value and lesser-
quality horses at the track. 
4 
 
The historiographical background of this project and its theoretical models can be located 
in the field of sports history. The New Social historians of the late 1960s were instrumental in the 
development of sports history as an independent field. The North American Society for Sport 
History was created in 1972, but most of the initial scholarship was focused on baseball or 
biography. It was not until the 1980s that incisive studies on American sports began to appear. 
Stephen Riess captures the early state of the field in his 1990 article on “The New Sport 
History”; he identified three main models that serve to explain the rise of organized sport in the 
period from 1850 to 1920.
6
 The first is the modernization model, promoted by Melvin Adelman 
and Allen Guttman, which claims that modern sports are inherently different from those of 
earlier periods because of the introduction of the Protestant work ethic and the new methods of 
bureaucracy, rationality, and order that dominated the period.
7
 The second model can be found in 
Benjamin Rader’s work where he argues that the process of organization was the result of 
industrial capitalism in the evolving urban environment.
8
 The third model emphasizes the 
centrality of urbanization to the rise of organized sport. Though the other two models do touch 
on urban evolution, this third model, most notably advocated by Riess, focuses on sport as both a 
product of urbanization and a factor in the process of urbanization.
9
 The physical structure of the 
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 Steven A. Reiss, “The New Sport History,” Reviews in American History 18, no. 3 (September 
1990): 311-325. 
 
7
 See Melvin L. Adelman, “The First Modern Sport in America: Harness Racing in New York 
City, 1825-1870,” Journal of Sport History 8, no. 1 (Spring 1981): 5-32.; Allen Guttman, From Ritual to 
Record: The Nature of Modern Sports (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978). 
 
8
 See Benjamin G. Rader, American Sports: From the Age of Folk Games to the Age of Televised 
Sports, 3
rd
 ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1996 [1983]). 
 
9
 See Stephen A. Riess, City Games: The Evolution of American Urban Society and the Rise of 
Sports (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989). 
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city, its social organization, and its value system all combined to influence the organization, 
rationalization, and professionalization of sport. 
This study will fuse Melvin Adelman’s modernization framework with Riess’s model 
stressing the processes of urbanization in both producing and being influenced by organized 
sport. Adelman’s process of modernization focus on two ideal sporting types – the modern and 
the premodern – and how they are both characterized by the absence or presence of bureaucracy, 
rationality, and order. These sporting types mesh the new social history with the organizational 
school, characterized by Louis Galambos, in assuming that “some of the most (if not the single 
most) important changes which have taken place in modern America have centered about a shift 
from small-scale, informal, locally or regionally oriented groups to large-scale, national, formal 
organizations.”10 As such, Adelman identifies six characteristics that define the ideal sporting 
types: organization, rules, competition, role differentiation, public information, and statistics and 
records. The premodern sport was one that was generally unorganized, governed by simple 
unwritten rules; it garnered little national attention, with nearly non-existent records and only 
limited local public information; and it had little role differentiation between players and 
spectators. As the factors of modernization and urbanization transformed the sport towards the 
modern sporting ideal, these attributes changed too, reflecting the modern bureaucratic system of 
order. Formal organizations arose, distinguishing themselves between the local, regional, and 
national level; rules of the sport were standardized and implemented by the national body; 
national competition superimposed itself on local contests, giving contestants the ability to earn 
national reputations; achievements are recorded and then published and reported regularly by 
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 Louis Galambos, “The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History,” 
Business History Review 44, no. 3 (Autumn 1970): 280. 
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both local newspapers and national sporting journals; and a system of high role differentiation 
developed, creating the emergence of specialized professions.
11
 The ideals of bureaucracy, 
rationality, and order were important to the growth of the jockey clubs of the postbellum period, 
but the clubs themselves also had a significant role in the processes of urbanization. 
Another concept that is just as important to the development of sport is that of the 
“sportsman.” Americans of the nineteenth century believed two types of sportsmen existed: the 
amateur and the professional. The “amateur sportsman” played for a love of competition, as a 
rite of honor, or out of a sense of pride; the “professional sportsman” meanwhile participated in 
the sports world mainly in search of profit. The antebellum planter aristocracy of Louisiana had 
the time and capital necessary to indulge in horse racing without any financial motive, but the 
postbellum turfmen saw the New Orleans tracks as their opportunity to strike it rich. The 
modernizing turfman was always present in Southern racing, but it was not until the diminished 
power of the planter aristocracy in the postbellum years that he was able to carve out a niche in 
the leadership of the sport. 
Historians have only recently begun to explore these socio-cultural developments in the 
sphere of American horse racing.
12
 While most contemporary Americans pay little attention to 
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 Adelman, 6. 
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 The type of horse racing investigated in this thesis is thoroughbred flat racing, which was by far 
the most prevalent and popular type of racing on Southern tracks. Quarter-horse racing has a longer 
history in the South, especially in the colonial period, but the quality was generally lesser than that of 
thoroughbred racing. Flat racing is a running race where multiple ridered horses gallop down a straight or 
oval track. It differs from steeplechase and hurdling where horses jump over obstacles. It also differs from 
trotting and harness racing where horses pull a vehicle and driver behind them while they pace or trot 
instead of gallop. Harness-racing also used standard-bred horses, or trotters, instead of thoroughbreds – 
the thoroughbred being distinct by its pure-bred lineage. These other types of racing were popular in some 
areas, but they had neither the history nor the impact that thoroughbred racing did in American society. G. 
Clark Cummings, “The Language of Horse Racing,” American Speech 30, no. 1 (Feb. 1955): 17-18. 
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horse racing beyond the “Fastest Two Minutes in Sports,” the Kentucky Derby, for many 
Americans in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the world of the turf was an essential 
component of their life, more than just a leisure activity. Baseball is often referred to as “the 
national game,” but during the nineteenth century and through the turn of the twentieth century, 
horse racing held dominance in the American mind.
13
 For many Americans, the track was an 
“institution that defined who they were or who they wished to become.”14 It was an institution 
that connected Americans of all social classes – as the mainstay of an elite gentry; as a status 
symbol for the middle-class who aspired to become elites; as a place for the common man to 
opine on the merits of a horse and wager money to back his faith – for any man’s betting money 
was equal to another’s. Racial harmony was also evident at the track for much of its early 
history, though slavery and black subordination were still present and necessary for the 
antebellum turfmen to maintain social order. 
Only in the past two decades have studies emerged asserting that horse racing was not 
just a leisure activity for Americans, but an institution that defined class and race relations. 
Edward Hotaling’s The Great Black Jockeys is an informative evaluation of how African 
American men succeeded in the realm of horse racing. Unfortunately, his analysis is minimal, 
though he lays the ground work by exhuming the lives of these men who have been relegated to 
the dustbin of history.
15
 The most recent of these studies is Katherine Mooney’s Race Horse 
                                                 
13
 Peter Morris, A Game of Inches: The Story Behind the Innovations that Shaped Baseball, Rev. 
ed. (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2010), 564. See also, George B. Kirsch, Baseball in Blue and Gray: The 
National Pastime during the Civil War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). Baseball at this 
time is only the “national game” in terms of the growing nationalist spirit surrounding it. 
 
14
 Mooney, 3. 
 
15
 Edward Hotaling, The Great Black Jockeys: The Lives and Times of the Men who Dominated 
America’s First National Sport (Rocklin, CA: Prima Publishing, 1999). 
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Men: How Slavery and Freedom Were Made at the Racetrack. Mooney examines the same men 
that Hotaling does, but she provides remarkable analysis in which she identifies the relationships 
between thoroughbred horse racing, politics, black labor, and race relations. She fulfills what 
historian Amy Bass would call an ideal sports history by arguing that the track society, especially 
in the south, helped shape the direction of American politics on issues of race.
16
 Mooney 
discusses how southern turfmen “believed in the necessity of hierarchy to make a great and 
modern United States and how hard they were willing to work to protect social divisions and 
inequalities.”17 Both Hotaling and Mooney’s works deal exclusively with horse racing, but 
references to the importance of horse racing as both a leisure activity and a society institution can 
be found on the peripheries of many other works of historical scholarship.
18
 
Most of the primary sources used in this study are newspaper accounts of the races. These 
papers typified Adelman’s framework of modernization in how they reported on horse racing. 
The antebellum newspapers generally only reported on the local races, and at that time, only a 
handful of national sporting journals existed, most notably Spirit of the Times. The proliferation 
                                                 
16
 In a roundtable in the Journal of American History, Amy Bass wrote that one of the problems 
in bestowing legitimacy on sports historians is the “old-school” style of sports history that solely 
incorporated the sports figures and institutions into the existing historical narrative. Instead, the historian 
should strive to show how socio-cultural developments were created in the realm of sports. Amy Bass, 
“State of the Field: Sports History and the ‘Cultural Turn,’” Journal of American History 101, no. 1 (June 
2014): 154. 
 
17
 Mooney, 6. 
 
18
 See Ted Ownby, Subduing Satan: Religion, Recreation, and Manhood in the Rural South, 
1865-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990).; Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern 
Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South,  25
th
 Anniv. Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007).; Winthrop Jordan, Tumult and Silence at Second Creek: An Inquiry into a Civil War Slave 
Conspiracy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996).; Edwin Adams Davis and William 
Ransom Hogan, The Barber of Natchez (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973). Oddly 
though, any and all mentions of New Orleans horse racing, or even sports in general, seem to be missing 
from Louise McKinney’s New Orleans: A Cultural History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
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of newspapers after the Civil War and the introduction of a dedicated sporting page to most 
papers fed the voracious appetites of Americans to consume news of the turf across the nation. 
While some newspapers still shared stories, the vast increase in individual reporting by 
newspapers and periodicals meant that there were multiple accounts of the major horse races of 
the American turf. The approach of these writers to the notion of athleticism and athletes differed 
depending on the time and place. The early articles equated the wisdom of the owners in 
breeding and training horses with the athleticism exhibited by the horses.
19
 Other accounts 
discussed the athletic abilities of the horses in an anthropomorphized manner. In these accounts, 
the horses instinctively knew what to do and were capable of strategizing to achieve victory.
20
 
Jockeys were rarely mentioned in early accounts, and only the most successful of the riders made 
it into later stories. 
It should also be noted that sources from black horsemen are much less common than 
those by white writers about black horsemen. But the idea of finding objective truths about black 
horsemen in accounts by white turfmen is much less important than what these accounts say 
about how white turfmen viewed their relationship and their belief in the necessity of black 
horsemen’s talent and continued subordination. Recollections and reports of the black horsemen 
after emancipation highlighted their attempts to define freedom on the track. These men had a 
personal stake in creating this definition, as most of them had either learned their skills during 
slavery or were apprentices of riders who had. Some later writers conversely believed that the 
turf had been a trap for black men, removing them from the black community and connecting 
their fortunes with those of white turfmen. Arna Bontemps 1931 novel God Sends Sunday 
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 Even though the day-to-day training would be performed by slaves. 
 
20
 Even though the horses would generally be saddled by slave jockeys. 
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features a black horseman who “believed that kind of pride pulled unwary young men into a 
degrading dependence on rich white horse owners and a consequent adoption of white standards 
of value and white-sanctioned forms of self-destruction.”21 This view would not be shared by the 
white turfmen during and after Reconstruction, who were beginning to sense the pride that was 
generated by the African-Americans of the track. It was safe and acceptable for white turfmen to 
allow black horsemen during slavery when whites were secure in their control and domination, 
viewing their slaves as tools to affect their own social status, not human beings with any form of 
agency. But when they could no longer control the black egalitarian ideals after emancipation, 
white turfmen in the north and south united to force the black turfmen out of the visible roles at 
the track. 
 The New Orleans social and political struggles from the 1860s through the 1910s 
concerning the track were, in many respects, a metaphorical horse race. Like the “forgotten 
alternatives” described by C. Vann Woodward, the competing visions of the world of the turf 
were all in the running by the turn of the twentieth century. And just like a horse race, it was 
pace that would prove vital in determining a victor. Tom Ainslie’s Guide to Thoroughbred 
Racing asserts that “longer races are won or lost in the first three-quarters. This remains true 
whether the ultimate winner be a front-runner which leads all the way, or a stretch-runner which 
steams out of the pack to win in the last jump. The pace analyst looks for the horse able to set or 
overcome the fastest probable early pace without tiring too badly in the homestretch.”22 As 
African-Americans, Old South elites, New South capitalists and industrialists, Louisiana 
politicians, Progressive reformers, and religious reformers galloped down the race track of the 
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 Mooney, 15. 
 
22
 Tom Ainslie, Ainslie’s Complete Guide to Thoroughbred Racing (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1968), 245. 
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second half of the nineteenth century, the race remained wide open as they wound down the 
backstretch. Some of the horses began to lose steam as they rounded the last turn. When the 
horses representing the hopes and aspirations of all these competing factions regarding 
thoroughbred racing came down the homestretch of the late 1890s and 1900s, victory would only 
be achieved by the one best able to muster its energy for a final burst of speed. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
RACE FOR GLORY:  
THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN ROLE IN THE WORLD OF THE TURF 
 
In April 1854 at the Metairie Course in New Orleans, Abe Hawkins, a slave belonging to 
Duncan Kenner, saddled up on Lecomte, preparing to face off against Lexington, a fine 
thoroughbred horse out of Kentucky. In a rematch of the prior week’s Great Post Stakes, Abe, 
riding Lecomte, defeated Creole jockey Henry Meichon in a race that the New Orleans Picayune 
called “the greatest four mile race on record.”1 Fifty-four years later, jockey Jimmy Lee, after an 
incident in which several white jockeys conspired to box in his horse and prevent a fair chance 
for victory, sought out one of his competitors at the St. Charles Hotel in New Orleans and 
warned him that he “would stand for no nonsense.”2 Gossip had been circling the turf that “white 
riders had organized to draw the color line.”3 The divergent experiences of these two Louisiana 
jockeys exemplify the changing status of African-American jockeys in the world of the turf.  
The antebellum track, just like the plantation, was an arena that depended upon the labor 
of unfree black slaves and their success only served to maintain a system of strict racial hierarchy 
and subjugation. But the slaves’ horsemanship allowed them a unique set of privileges and a 
degree of autonomy that they used to challenge, negotiate, and redefine their conceptions of 
liberty and freedom. After emancipation, these former enslaved jockeys used their renown to ride 
independently and earned much national fame and fortune. Their experiences on the track 
sustained their hopes for the equality latent in the Reconstruction amendments and the equitable 
respect due them for their talents. As C. Vann Woodward argued in The Strange Career of Jim 
                                                 
1
 “Great Four Mile Day: The Fastest Time on Record!” Daily Picayune, April 9, 1854. 
 
2
 “Gossip of the Racetrack,” New York Sun, May 23, 1908. 
 
3
 “Negro Jockeys Shut Out,” New York Times, July 28, 1900. 
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Crow, this period was one of “forgotten alternatives” and the African-Americans of the turf 
fought to defend their dreams of emancipation in the face of determined white supremacy.
4
 But 
after the entrenchment of Jim Crow, white fears arose that the continued success of black jockeys 
would only inflame the passions of decidedly non-servile African-Americans across the nation. 
The jockeys’ egalitarian conduct did not conform to the image of black Americans that resonated 
with many white Americans in the Jim Crow era. Throughout the first decade of the twentieth 
century, black jockeys were forced off the track by a variety of methods, both within the 
structure of the sport and without. Believing that racial concord there would bring about disorder 
in society, white Americans created the societal threat of the black jockey and advocated 
repression to combat him. In doing so, they were able to nationally establish unity and order 
through the “time-honored device [of] exclusion” and control.5 
The planter aristocracy of the Old South drew comparisons between their slaves and 
thoroughbred horses. John B. Irving, in his history of the South Carolina Jockey Club, argued 
that a well-trained thoroughbred was a symbol of obedience and a sign of the natural order.
6
 
Other social critics noted this rhetoric too, like the Reverend Joseph Holt Ingraham who 
compared the slave market to horse trading in that slaves “are handed from one [master] to 
another with the passiveness of a purchased horse.”7 The relationship is made literal in Mortimer 
Thomson’s account of a slave auction in Savannah, Georgia, in March 1859. The slaves were 
brought to the race course in Savannah “and there quartered in the sheds erected for the 
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accommodation of the horses and carriages of gentlemen attending the races.”8 In both 
Ingraham’s and Thomson’s accounts, the slaves were inspected like horses with potential buyers 
“pulling their mouths open to see their teeth, pinching their limbs to find how muscular they 
were, walking them up and down to detect any signs of lameness.”9  John Gilmer Speed still 
used the language of submission in his 1905 history of The Horse in America, describing an 
unruly “bully” horse as one that “knows the touch of the master hand and stops his ‘monkey 
shines’ in very short order.”10 Even the African-American jockeys bought into the comparative 
rhetoric. Instead of identifying with the submissive relationship of horse to master, however, 
their close connection to the horses made them aware of the wild spirit and freedom that 
characterized the thoroughbred. The jockeys saw the horse trainers and grooms as servile, like a 
broken horse. The sense of freedom identified in the thoroughbred horse was something that the 
jockeys believed they could also locate within themselves. 
The early slave jockeys of the American turf may have internalized some conception of 
freedom that came from riding the horse. But slaves served as more than just jockeys in their 
many roles on the track. First and foremost, they were the primary caretakers of the stables and 
horses. When William J. Minor published his instructions on how to train two year old horses, he 
wanted to pass on important knowledge to new horse owners and breeders. He included 
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extremely detailed descriptions on certain topics, such as what to feed horses, what exercise 
techniques are best, what modes of discipline can be used. But the information that was most 
likely to vary dependent on each horse, and thus could be most readily identified by someone 
who had an instinct and closeness with the horse, was left unsaid.
11
 These silences were likely 
because of Minor’s belief that good horse owners or breeders would have a knowledgeable slave 
working in their stables with the experience necessary to overcome those gaps. The owner need 
not worry about those trivialities and should focus on major duties instead.
12
 The slaves who 
worked as grooms would be the ones taking care of these horses daily. They would start young, 
the boys being trained under experienced grooms who could teach them how to safely clean, 
feed, and nurture the half-ton animal. 
Black slaves were also to be found as spectators at the race tracks. Irving described the 
South Carolina courses as having a “Backgammon Board appearance… [with] black and white 
groups, dotting the Course here and there.”13 The presence of black slaves in the racing crowds 
enforced racial hierarchies and some earned the privilege of being able to attend the races during 
any recreational opportunity. This could be revoked at any point, however, especially in a cruel 
fashion. British traveler Isaac Weld noted in the Carolinas and Georgia that “it is no uncommon 
thing there, to see gangs of negroes staked at a horse race, and to see these unfortunate beings 
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bandied about from one set of drunken gamblers to another.”14 The slave attendees were 
constantly aware of their status at the race track, even while they were able to enjoy and bet on 
the races. 
The most visible slave role on the track was that of jockey. If a groom were small 
enough, he might also double as a jockey. As three-year-old thoroughbreds in competitive races 
could generally only carry ninety pounds, which included the jockey, saddle, and other 
equipment, small boys or young men were preferred for the role. Skill was not all that 
important.
15
 The most important characteristic for a slave jockey was a trim figure. Even that 
could be overcome as Porter’s Spirit of the Times recommended “burying [Negro jockeys] three 
times a week (four hours at a time) in stable manure, up to their chins,” for a steaming process 
that would stunt their growth and reduce their weight.
16
 Other than the elite turfmen who rode 
their own horses as an aristocratic symbol, jockeying was seen as “nigger work,” as noted by 
David Wiggins in his study of black athletes, arguing that it paradoxically “greatly enlarged the 
black jockey’s economic and social opportunities.”17 Not all Southern turfmen agreed with this 
sentiment, though, and Duncan Kenner was one of those who “gave nearly as much attention to 
the training of his young Negro riders as he did to his steeds.”18 But Kenner was an exception 
among his peers. Even as late as the 1890s, for the stable owner looking for a jockey among the 
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“colored boys,” the Thoroughbred Record recommended just walking “through the streets of any 
Southern town where niggers are as plentiful as flies… and pick a likely boy off the street.”19 
With little emphasis on skill on the early turf, the jockey was little more than a slim fellow who 
could direct a horse. 
But for the white turfmen, racing was an institution that defined people and solidified 
hierarchy, both among themselves and over their black slaves. Despite the wealth of the white 
planters who funded and organized the races, their stables could not function without their 
dependence on the skill of black horsemen. The ideas of honor that united white turfmen, 
reinforced through victories at the track, would not exist without the black expertise in their 
stables. The slave owners did acknowledge this to some extent in that the slaves who took care of 
the horses were afforded a separate status and form of autonomous privilege denied other 
plantation slaves. This could be seen at Duncan F. Kenner’s Ashland plantation where slaves 
associated with Kenner’s racing stable, including Henry Hammond, were able to progress from 
stable hand to jockey to coachman.
20
 With that privilege then came the great pressure not to 
upset the tensions inherent between their autonomy and slavery. On sugar planter William J. 
Minor’s plantation, he disciplined the slave horsemen who erred, starting with physical abuse, 
then sending them out to work as a field slave.
21
 Black horsemen balanced a unique set of 
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pressures than did other slaves on the plantation as can be seen through the lives of Abe Hawkins 
and Charles Stewart.  
Few slave jockeys received national acclaim, but Duncan Kenner’s slave, Abe Hawkins 
earned renown because of his skills in the Lexington-Lecomte rivalry. Listed among all the other 
slaves in Duncan Kenner’s slave register, Abe was exceptional at his task – racing horses.22 The 
Picayune lamented that “everybody can’t have Abe,” but Kenner was certainly grateful for his 
slave, as Abe’s prestige carried himself and Kenner’s stables to national prominence.23 Abe 
surpassed other jockeys in print, often being the only one mentioned by name in news articles 
about races.
24
 However, Abe’s celebrity did not worry Southern white turfmen at all. Instead, his 
victories conferred prestige upon them and their horses, in addition to reasserting their view of 
racial harmony within hierarchy. 
Charles Stewart served in the most important position on the antebellum turf, as a trainer. 
Even among knowledgeable horse owners, they still had a professional overseer to train the 
horses, often an experienced black slave. The life of a horseman necessitated mobility – 
something commonly lacking in any definition of slavery. The privileges afforded to black 
horsemen included general mobility to facilitate the movement of horses and the opportunity to 
earn a slight income with the success of the stable. The centrality of the trainer’s role in 
managing the stables meant that the enslaved trainers, especially successful ones, were able to 
earn some fame, privilege, and fortune. Irving’s history of South Carolina mentions Colonel 
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Richard Singleton’s slave trainer, Cornelius, known for “his attachment to his master, and 
devotedness to his true interests,” famous at the Charleston race course and remembered fondly 
as “a feature in the crowd upon the race field.”25 The most notable antebellum trainer however 
was Charles Stewart, a slave trainer whose story was transcribed by Annie Porter, niece of the 
Louisiana sugar planter, Alexander Porter.
26
 
Charles Stewart learned the skills of the turf as a slave boy in the Virginia stables of 
William Ransom Johnson, a prominent politician and horseman. He so distinguished himself that 
he soon was traveling long distances solo between Johnson’s stables in Virginia and Kentucky to 
deliver horses and supervise operations. When he desired to marry, looking for “a good nigger to 
cook and wash for [him],” he found his ideal wife in Betsey Dandridge. She had just been sold to 
another owner, but Stewart located him at the Richmond courthouse, where he was talking with a 
few other white men. Walking up and introducing himself as “Colonel Johnson’s Charles,” 
Stewart recalled with delight how he “saw two or three gentlemen [he] knew well standing by, 
but [he] didn’t ask anybody to speak for [him]; [he] spoke for [himself].”27 Being told that her 
price was $350, Stewart went around to the office of Johnson’s agent, who also served as his 
agent, and withdrew the money to purchase Betsey Dandridge. After four years of unhappily 
wedded life in which Stewart claimed that no form of physical abuse or discipline could 
convince her to tell the truth, he sold his wife back to her former owner for the same price. He 
also included their children in the deal to make up for the “the wear and tear” on his wife, 
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relating it to horse-breeding and the belief that in a bad breed, “a colt is most apt to take after the 
dam, anyhow.”28 Preferring the subservience of animals, Stewart used the money from selling his 
family to purchase a horse named Brown Jim, who “was worth the money.”29 
Alexander Porter purchased Stewart in 1841 and immediately put him in charge of “a 
racing establishment where there were never less than twelve horses in training, and which kept 
forty or forty-five men and boys constantly employed.”30 Stewart’s sale was a matter of pride for 
him, as his service to Johnson allowed him to request his own sale. After the death of Stewart’s 
second wife, he met Judge Porter who was traveling through Kentucky in search of a new head 
trainer. Stewart negotiated with Porter himself before agreeing on a price of $3,500 to go to 
Johnson. After finalizing his own sale, he went to his second wife’s owner and purchased his 
own son for $150, but then left him with his sister-in-law upon realizing that he “wasn’t sure 
they would let a free nigger, or rather a nigger that belonged to his own daddy, stay on the 
place.”31 As with his own purchase and sale of his first wife, Stewart worked within the slave 
system and white values system, demonstrating the importance of ownership to him, not 
freedom. He was not going to undermine his own privileged existence by threatening to bestow it 
on his family. 
Free black men, like William Johnson of Natchez, were also fond of the races. Edwin 
Davis and William Hogan noted in The Barber of Natchez that “William Johnson’s avid and 
sustained interest in horse racing was partially an outgrowth of life-long homage rendered to the 
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way of life practiced by the rich planters of the Natchez area.”32 Arna Bontemps and other 
African-American writers of the twentieth century would see this adoption of white values as a 
misstep for a free black man, but William Johnson viewed the track as his method of 
advancement in society. Colonel Adam L. Bingaman, the “Napoleon of the Southern Turf” and a 
great Natchez planter, even allowed Johnson to breed his horses with Bingaman’s prized 
bloodhorses, a measure of gratitude for a man who had earned some level of respect as one of the 
elite free black men in Natchez.
33
 Favors like these, no matter how genuine, served to further 
divide free black men from slaves. Even when “the white citizens of Natchez recognized that 
[Johnson] was at the top of the free Negro ladder… there was a demarcation line that he could 
not cross in relations with them,” and Johnson knew that to sustain his place in society meant 
falling in line with white standards of order.
34
 
   The defining characteristic of the black horseman on the antebellum turf can be described 
as privilege. Instead of denying the abilities of black horsemen, the white Southern turfmen 
allowed them to thrive. This not only brought great reward to the turfmen at the expense of black 
labor, but also demonstrated the turfmen’s assurance that the structure of slavery would constrain 
the horsemen from capitalizing on their privileges to oppose the system. The close relationship 
that linked black horsemen and white turfmen convinced the white men that racial harmony was 
possible, provided that it upheld racial hierarchies. As with William Johnson in the free black 
community, the black slave horsemen had to conform to the desires and values of white turfmen 
in order to maintain their privileges. 
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  The confidence among white turfmen that black horsemen would not take advantage of 
their privileges was challenged in an incident when Thomas J. Wells believed that his horse 
Lecomte had been drugged when he lost one of his races against Lexington. He suspected 
Lecomte’s jockey Abe had been the culprit, but also allowed that it may have been Lecomte’s 
trainer, Hark.
35
 The only evidence was anecdotal and conflicting as it implicated either Abe or 
Hark. The testimony of the slave Sam Page, one of Kenner’s horsemen, suggested Hark. Page 
claimed to have seen Hark harboring runaway slaves for a fee before betraying them and 
pocketing the money, insinuating that a man who would sell out his own people in bondage 
could not be trusted.
36
 Another source contradicted Page’s testimony, implying that Page was 
also manipulating the turfmen by creating that story. This source claimed that Abe was seen with 
a $100 bill and was very cautious with his suitcase, trusting only Sam Page to go near it.
37
 
Neither of the accused men ever admitted to drugging the horse, nor was there actually proof that 
the horse was drugged. Unable to determine any truth to the matter and because of the value of 
these black horsemen to their stables, Minor, Wells, and Kenner could not discipline the 
“prominent slave horsemen with anything but the subtlest pressures of privilege extended or 
withheld.”38 They simply pushed the issue aside and treated it as an exception to their idealized 
obedient slave narrative. They did not want to read too much into the different grudges and 
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games acted out among their slaves, afraid it would upset the comfort afforded by their belief in 
the complacent slave. 
 The outbreak of the Civil War in April 1861 did not just upset their belief system, but 
also decimated the Southern turf entirely. Black slaves capitalized on the disorder brought about 
by the war. Fears of a Natchez slave conspiracy in September 1861 led the planters to arrest 
many slaves, including several horsemen and carriage drivers, and imprison them at the race 
track in town where Adam Bingaman and William Minor once competed. Like the slave trainers, 
the carriage drivers in Natchez also had the privilege of mobility. They were able to attend horse 
races and “travel without a ‘pass,’ free of that document’s humiliating stamp of dependence,” as 
they traversed and conversed with the inhabitants of Natchez, free and slave.
39
 Minor himself 
was present at the Examination Committee inquiry where, by September 25, 1861, he thought it 
was “clearly proved that there was a plot between a number of negroes on several plantations in 
the neighborhood of ‘Second Creek’ and Negroes in Natchez… to rise to murder their master… 
and then to take possession of their mistresses and all property.”40 While Minor left no record on 
the number of men killed by the committee, another attendee, Benjamin Wailes recorded in his 
diary on October 23, 1861, that several of the condemned slaves “were taken out to the Race 
track and eight of them hung.”41 By using the race track as the setting for the torture, 
questioning, and executions, the Southern planter aristocracy and turfmen of Natchez were 
reasserting their authority in that place where they had established racial hierarchies and 
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subordination. The assertion of the slaves’ privileges now led to brutal repression instead of the 
ambivalence from Kenner, Minor, and Wells previously. 
 The war deprived Duncan Kenner and William Minor of their plantation and racing 
assets. In August 1862, Union troops landed at Kenner’s plantation, Ashland, confiscating as 
much property as they could, notably the horses and the riders.
42
 Kenner had been prepared for a 
Federal raid, mounting his prize-winning thoroughbred Sid Story and high-tailing it away from 
the incoming soldiers, quickly outpacing the Union cavalry.
43
 Kenner’s wife and children were 
left on their own. With few people to trust, they turned to one of Kenner’s former jockeys, Henry 
Hammond, “a very light mulatto” who “was connected with the racing stable, but growing too 
heavy for a jockey, he became a coachman.”44 Kenner’s wife gave a pistol to Hammond to help 
guard the family overnight until they could travel, trusting the horseman over the other slaves. 
The Union troops continued onward to Minor’s plantation, Waterloo, where they seized his 
livestock, nine race horses, and five stable boys. Protesting the unjust seizure of property, Minor 
eventually regained most of his property, with the exception of his horses, already on their way 
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to the auction block.
45
 Abe took advantage of the confusion provided by the raids to disappear, 
making his way to St. Louis to take advantage of his privileges, this time, as a free man. 
 Black horsemen, like Abe, believed that their skills and privileges learned on the 
Southern turf would bring them respect and opportunity. The track was still a place run on black 
labor and expertise; now with the coming of emancipation, the horsemen dreamed that their 
contributions would be acknowledged and valued. Abe began racing again in St. Louis in 1864, 
receiving mounts from multiple stables. One onlooker was amazed at Abe’s performance, saying 
“I have seen all the best jockeys of Europe; not one of them is nearly the equal of that old 
darkey.”46 Making his way around the Northern tracks, he earned a small fortune and sparked the 
interest of the sporting news in the latent talents of black jockeys, now riding as free men, though 
many were still riding for their former masters. Abe’s accomplishments confirmed Charles 
Dickens’ observation that even with such examples of black success, “and others yet more 
striking of emancipated negroes amassing large fortunes and obtaining high social positions – the 
partisans of slavery [dared] persist in declaring that a negro left to himself, would starve for very 
laziness.”47 Abe belied that notion of black laziness and proved that “the stimulus of partial 
freedom” which was awarded to slave jockeys, was “sufficient to awaken energies and ambition 
which slavery crushes to the dust.”48 
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Abe could have been a strong symbol for African-American rights and a threat to racial 
hierarchies. Instead, his legacy was one that sustained the white turfmen’s belief in submissive 
black horsemen. In a favorite story they told, Abe recognized a friend of Duncan Kenner’s at the 
Saratoga track. Knowing about Kenner’s losses in the war, Abe sent a message to his former 
master to tell him that “I have ridden a great many races here in the North and have made right 
smart of money. It is all in the bank and it is his if he wants it, because I am just as much his 
servant as I ever was.”49 Kenner responded that Abe was welcome back whenever he wanted. 
After falling ill shortly thereafter, Abe took Kenner’s offer and returned to Ashland, where 
Kenner “attended with paternal care to the wants of the supposed dying freeman, and saved him 
from the eager clutches of unwelcome death.”50 Abe finally died in June 1867 of consumption; 
Kenner did not bury him with the other slaves in the plantation cemetery, but instead in a small 
grave under a live oak tree overlooking the one-mile training track, the place where Abe had 
spent so much of his successful career. In such stories told by Southern turfmen, the freed 
horsemen were still subordinate to their former masters, but now it was of their own volition.  
It was in this atmosphere of freedom that horse racing rose to preeminence in the United 
States, with many states establishing derbies to showcase the top talent. The Kentucky Derby 
began as a modest affair relative to today’s race, but there was a confidence among the 
promoters that it would rise in prominence. The first Derby ran on May 17, 1875, and featured a 
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race card with almost all of the horses carrying African-American jockeys.
51
 One of those 
jockeys, Oliver Lewis, and black trainer Ansel Williamson, won with Aristides. During the 
1870s and 1880s, black and white horsemen shared the track in racial harmony, as the New 
Orleans Times noted in December 1873: “the darkies and whites mingle fraternally together, 
charmed into mutual happy sympathies by the inspiring influence of horse talk.”52 The greatest 
jockey to come out of the Derby though was Isaac Murphy, a man whose charismatic influence 
would fracture this harmonic existence and shake the foundations of American track society. 
 Isaac Murphy, one of the greatest African-American jockeys and a symbol of African-
Americans’ aspirations of dignity and respect, stood in direct opposition to the ideal jockey 
model that Southern turfmen saw in Abe. Born in 1861 as the son of a Union Army veteran, 
Murphy was apprenticed in the Lexington, Kentucky, stables of his mother’s employer. He 
earned his first major victory in 1875 and finished second in the Kentucky Derby in 1879. By 
1882, he was earning $10,000 per year with a bonus of $25 for every winning mount and still 
making $15 for each loss. Though Murphy was too young to have distinct memories of slavery, 
he spent his life on the turf surrounded by black men who imparted their wisdom and 
experiences to him. One of those men was the trainer Edward Brown, who earned in his lifetime 
“$100,000 in cash, a stunning fortune for a man who had been sold on the auction block in 
Lexington as a youth.”53 After emancipation, Brown asserted his independence as a trainer, with 
                                                 
51
 Ed Hotaling, The Great Black Jockeys: The Lives and Times of the Men Who Dominated 
America’s First National Sport (Rocklin, CA: Forum, 1999), 230. Hotaling complicates the common 
“fact” that “fourteen of the fifteen jockeys in the first Kentucky Derby were black,” which continues to be 
conveyed despite the incompleteness of the records. 
 
52
 New Orleans Times, December 14, 1873. Quoted in Dale Somers, The Rise of Sports in New 
Orleans, 1850-1900 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), 97. 
 
53
 Mooney, 184. 
 
28 
 
his horses producing much success on the Kentucky tracks. Brown demonstrated for Murphy the 
possibilities that came from freedom, possibilities that Murphy was determined to capture 
himself. 
Murphy’s success, winning three Kentucky Derbies – 1884, 1890, and 1891 – among 
many other stakes races, elevated him to a category of jockey that few others would ever reach. 
His fortune of $125,000, as reported in 1887, was also unprecedented for both a black man and a 
jockey.
54
 He led the way for a new professional class of black horsemen who took over the tracks 
in the 1870s and 1880s. As the Spirit of the Times reported in 1887, Murphy, Lewis, and other 
African-American jockeys “have almost monopolized the best mounts, and have been singularly 
successful.”55 The New York Herald, in a fascination with the racial characteristics of these men, 
wrote that “if a composite photograph had been made of the jockeys who rode the six winners,” 
after the African-American jockeys swept the card at Gravesend, “it would have been as black as 
Erebus. There wouldn’t have been a single light line in it, unless the camera happened to catch 
[Anthony] Hamilton with his mouth wide open displaying the pearly white teeth which form the 
only relieving feature of his coal black face.”56 Murphy was the turf’s embodiment of what 
would later be described as “black cool,” as practiced by Jack Johnson, Willie Mays, and 
countless other black athletes. “Defiance was the essence of Black cool,” artist Hank Willis 
Thomas argues. “It was one way for poor youth to defy the weight and gravity of their social 
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class.”57 Thomas continues that “it didn’t matter if he had the most material value, because he 
had an inner confidence that no one could knock down.”58 Murphy’s reputation and defiance in 
the face of white prejudice made him a symbol not just for black turfmen, but black men across 
the nation. Heavyweight boxer Jack Johnson grew up in Galveston, Texas, dreaming of 
emulating his hero, Isaac Murphy. Johnson, before he grew too big to become a jockey, lost a job 
at “a Galveston livery stable when he exhausted one of the horses in his charge, racing with his 
friends in unauthorized imitation of his idol.” 59 The success of Murphy and other black 
horsemen in the 1880s energized black Americans who hoped that they would usher in an era of 
equality afforded them through their accomplishments and celebrity. 
Part of Murphy’s success came from advancements in the field of jockeyship as it 
professionalized. There were two main styles in riding:  the traditional English style and the 
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newer American, or monkey-seat, style.
60
 The evolution of jockeyship in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century brought attention to these changes, bringing victory to the practitioners of 
the new style. The older English style has a seat set further back on the horse and longer stirrups 
for greater control of horse movement, as is necessary in dressage. The American rider moved 
the seat further up on the horse, shifting both weight and control. This style also used shorter 
stirrups, allowing for maximum speed from the horse.
 61
 This hunched-up crouch while sitting on 
the horse’s shoulders allowed the horse to further extend its stride compared to the older style. 
The American riding style benefitted the changing nature of the American thoroughbred race 
with a focus on speed. Instead of saving energy at the beginning of the race and sprinting for the 
last half-mile, the jockeys would often run the race from start to finish, hoping to get a strong 
lead and carry it to the finish line. A horse that was ahead of the pack could not be interfered 
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with by the other riders or pocketed.
62
 Isaac Murphy was known for his use of the “monkey seat” 
which became the typical American jockey style by the turn of the twentieth century.
 63
 
Isaac Murphy and other black horsemen established patronage and professional networks 
to advance economic and social mobility among African-Americans. Edward Brown negotiated a 
$1,000 contract with Isaac Murphy to ride his horses, the largest amount known at that time to be 
paid from an African-American owner to an African-American jockey.
64
 Black horsemen with 
insider information on horse and track conditions passed it along to their friends, who were then 
able to win big with the gamblers. White turfmen grew concerned at the increasing self-reliance 
of the black horsemen. The New York Sportsman reported on the grievances aired by the 
bookmakers at the Belmont Stakes in 1875, that because “Old Ansel [Williamson], [Oliver] 
Lewis, and the western ‘colored capitalists’ in general came down, like the wolf on the fold, with 
heavy investments,” they operated at a major loss.65 The jockey William Walker, despite 
winning the 1877 Kentucky Derby, was threatened by the Louisville Jockey Club president M. 
Lewis Clark, who suspected that Walker was going to throw the race. “You will be watched the 
whole way,” warned Clark, “and if you do not ride to win, a rope will be put about your neck, 
and you will be hung to that tree yonder,”— accentuating the threat by gesturing at a tree near 
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the judges’ stand – “and I will help to do it.”66 Even when suspicions of cheating were 
unfounded, the threat of lynching was invoked as a way to control the “excesses of freedom” that 
white turfmen identified in the black horsemen.
67
  
 In response to the challenge afforded by Isaac Murphy, white turfmen utilized different 
rhetorical strategies to restrain Murphy’s influence. Some turfmen completely denied the abilities 
of black men, dismissing Murphy and other horsemen as rare examples of their race, who might 
be a model for “many Afro-Charlestonians… who are now loafing around picking up a living by 
pilfering and raiding hen roosts.”68 But those turfmen were only a small, but growing number, as 
the majority reasserted the beliefs of Duncan Kenner, William Minor, and other antebellum 
horsemen that while black horsemen were special, they would work within the white system of 
racial hierarchy and not upset the existing order. Contemporary turf historian John H. Davis was 
one of the men who still subscribed to the antebellum belief in admiring black horsemanship but 
as a means to enforce racial hierarchy. Davis acknowledged Murphy’s celebrity but qualified it: 
“He was black of skin, but his heart was white as snow.”69 Despite Murphy’s charisma in black 
society, he still exhibited some “safe” ideas regarding employment demonstrated by his loyalty 
to one farm, refusing lucrative contracts elsewhere. A contributor to the Spirit of the Times 
described Murphy’s loyalty as such: “When a nigger’s bad, he’s d—d bad; no doubt about it. But 
sir, when a nigger is attached to you and yours, all the money in New York couldn’t make him 
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sell you out.”70 Murphy, at least, conformed to white Southern turfmen’s worldview on loyalty, 
even as he continued to flout obedience. 
 The fears of white society continued to be provoked by black demands for equality. 
These fears that once manifested themselves quietly in some areas of horse racing now came to 
the forefront. Isaac Murphy began to recognize his market value and cast off his loyalty in favor 
of selectively negotiating employment, using legal force and negotiating contracts to protect his 
interests.
71
 The idea of a successful black professional who understood his market potential, who 
exercised his legal rights, and who wielded influence over a sizable portion of the American 
populace was a very real fear for white Southerners and turfmen. As historian Edward Ayers 
summarized the white fears, “black claims to respect… exceeded their bounds.”72 The continued 
identification of African-Americans with Murphy also bred concern, especially as seen in a 
common incident when after Murphy received a minor disciplinary infraction, “every negro on 
the track from the smallest pickaninny to the trainers espoused Murphy’s cause as if it were their 
own.”73 White turfmen had to find a suitable answer for Isaac Murphy and they finally located 
one in a highly-publicized matchup against leading jockey Edward “Snapper” Garrison. 
In a prelude to the later “Great White Hope” matches of the boxing world, Murphy, 
riding Salvator, faced Garrison, aboard Tenny, at the Coney Island Race Course on June 26, 
1890. If Garrison won, it would be considered as a victory for white supremacy. In front of a 
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crowd of 25,000 people, Murphy took a thundering lead, setting records for the first mile and 
next eighth, while distancing himself from Garrison and Tenny. Garrison pulled out his whip and 
as they came around the far turn into the homestretch, Tenny exhibited a burst of speed that 
closed the gap with Salvator, putting them neck and neck down to the wire. Garrison was known 
for his thrilling “Garrison finish,” a whip-driven, come-from-behind victory by the narrowest of 
margins. In this race however, a photo-finish revealed that not only did Murphy win, but he 
appeared to take his victory in stride.
74
 The photo showed that Murphy looked the part of grace 
in contrast to the frenetic energy that overtook Garrison. Murphy’s victory and his prolonged 
celebration was a trigger for corrective action; it was his Icarus moment, as he had transcended 
the unspoken limitations on success for black men and was about to come crashing back to meet 
the reality of the New South. 
 These correctives were applied to Murphy throughout the following months and 
continued to follow him for the rest of his career. After falling out of the saddle following an 
inexplicable last-place finish, reports proliferated that the renowned jockey was drunk, and he 
was suspended from racing for a time. As historian Ted Ownby notes in his study of Southern 
recreation culture, “one of the many hostile and suspicious beliefs of Southern whites linked the 
freedmen with wanton alcoholism.”75 Murphy maintained that he had been sober for the race, 
and that his failure was the result of illness rather than drunkenness. In retrospect, his dizzy spell 
might have been the result of “flipping” – massive weight fluctuations between racing seasons 
and the struggle to keep under a riding weight. The “Rules of Racing” for the Jockey Club in 
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1908, in a rule that has been enforced throughout most eras of American thoroughbred racing, 
stated “a horse shall not be qualified to run in a race with more than 5 lbs. overweight.”76 
Maintaining a racing weight was a struggle shared by all jockeys. Black jockey Wallace Hicks, 
after losing his contract for failure to remain under 110 pounds, simply remarked “well, every 
man has his weakness. With some it’s whiskey and women - with me, it’s gumbo and chicken.”77 
Murphy’s main strategy to make weight was to starve himself and take long walks in the days 
before a race, undermining his health and eventually leading to the pneumonia that would kill 
him.
78
 Champagne was one method of combating the effects of flipping, and it is possible that 
Murphy had been drinking champagne as a stimulant, as many other jockeys did in a quasi-
medicinal manner.
79
 
Though he won the Kentucky Derby in 1891, it was merely the coda to an illustrious 
career, tainted by scandal. Murphy, in a display of frustration, told a reporter for the Spirit of the 
Times that he hoped he could repair his reputation down in New Orleans since, “I am disgusted 
with the way they treated me in the East during the summer. When I won it was all right, but 
when I lost, and when not on the best horse, they would say, ‘There, that nigger is drunk again.’ I 
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tell you, I am disgusted and soured on the whole business.”80 To the delight of white Southern 
turfmen, Murphy was never able to regain his former glory, dying at age thirty-five on February 
12, 1896 – the same year as Plessy v. Ferguson. But the $30,000 he bequeathed to his wife and 
the contracts that he earned proved that jockeyship was more than just “nigger work.” Murphy 
marked the beginning of the end, the apogee of opportunity for black post-bellum horsemen. As 
the color line shifted throughout the 1890s and 1900s, white turfmen thought it less proper for 
black men to make their living as jockeys.
81
 
As Ray Stannard Baker observed in 1904, while Southerners speak of the “threat of 
Negro domination,” meaning black political power, “there exists a far more real and sinister form 
of Negro domination. For the Negro still dominates the thought of the South.”82 The rise and 
subsequent decline of black liberties after the Civil War were facilitated by the reconciliation of 
Northern and Southern turfmen as the “racing men of the 1870s created in miniature at the track 
the political and economic structures they favored, and they strengthened the bonds of 
camaraderie and common interest that could give their models formative power on a national 
scale.”83 The rules that governed the American Jockey Club in New York prevented a jockey 
from switching between employers without the permission of his current manager, barring him 
from racing any horses if he left without consent. In a similar system of subordination to that 
established on Southern plantations where “planters seeking to hold on to the workers they 
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already had might favor draconian measures to keep blacks from leaving,” the American Jockey 
Club restricted black mobility, and hence, freedom, by taking away a jockey’s ability to amend 
his employment obligations through the removal of his labor.
84
 August Belmont – financier, 
Jockey Club leader, Democratic National Committee chairman, and head of the emergent post-
bellum elite – sought to create a new Democratic union, uniting Northern industrialists, white 
Southerners, and city political machines. His political and economic efforts championed the 
reunion of Northern and Southern turfmen, now united in their desire to enforce order and strict 
racial hierarchy at the track. 
Beyond the strict control of labor by the Jockey Clubs, racial hierarchies were often 
reinforced through segregation. This method was present, but not entirely effective in New 
Orleans. Before 1871, most Louisiana tracks had policies like that of the Metairie Jockey Club, 
allowing black spectators to any part of the grandstand with general admission tickets – barring, 
of course, the section for club members, and the section for ladies, thereby, both reinforcing class 
standing and protecting the virtues of southern white womanhood. The Metairie Jockey Club 
revised this policy in 1871, instituting a separate grandstand for black attendees. Historian Dale 
Somers argues that this was likely the club’s manner of “[demonstrating] opposition to Radical 
                                                 
84
 William Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge: Black Mobility and the Southern White Quest for Racial 
Control, 1861-1915 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), xv.; This is also very similar 
to the reserve clause set up in other sports leagues, most notably challenged by African-American 
baseball player Curt Flood in the landmark Supreme Court case Flood v. Kuhn (1972). Flood explained 
his rationale for the lawsuit on ABC’s Wide World of Sports, saying, “I don’t think there is anything more 
damaging to a person’s ego as a human being than to be traded or bought and sold like a piece of 
property.” When Howard Cosell followed up that Flood’s $90,000 annual salary was not slave wages, 
Flood cut straight to the heart of the matter, arguing that “a well-paid slave is nonetheless a slave.” Brad 
Snyder, A Well-Paid Slave: Curt Flood’s Fight for Free Agency in Professional Sports (New York: 
Viking, 2006), 103-104. 
 
38 
 
civil rights policies.”85 The African-American newspaper, the Louisianian, reported on the return 
of the “demonic spirit of caste… for the first time, there has been erected a separate stand on the 
ground, to prevent the mingling of whey faces, and sang melees…. The managers of the course 
have pandered to the ignoble passions and prejudices of those who possess no other claim to 
superiority, than the external shading of a skin.”86 The editor then exhorted African-American 
men not to idly accept “this deliberate insult to our manhood and our self-respect,” and rather 
than continuing to patronize the courses, to “withhold every cent of it,” and not “contribute your 
money to the support of institutions which take your money, and give the value of it to others.”87 
When the Louisiana Jockey Club gained control of the New Orleans turf later that year, it 
returned to the older policy, allowing blacks into the public grandstand, though, barring them 
from the quarter stretch near the finish line.
88
 This newer policy of the Louisiana Jockey Club 
was itself contested, when two African-American racing enthusiasts sued the club in May 1874, 
arguing that by refusing to sell them admission to the quarter stretch, the club violated the law 
guaranteeing equal access to public accommodations. Even with support from the Louisianian 
and the black community, the lawsuit failed. Despite these small measures, segregation was 
generally not prevalent on the New Orleans tracks, and as historian Dale Somers observed 
“racial policies and attitudes in [New Orleans] remained far from rigid before the 1890s.” 89 
Some measure of racial harmony did exist on the tracks. 
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That racial harmony would be challenged by demographic changes within New Orleans. 
Historian Joy Jackson argues that the heightened racial tension grew out of an increase in the 
black population of the city, increasing over twenty percent in the decade from 1890 to 1900.
90
 
She believes that the “newcomers from the country were likely to get into trouble more easily 
[than urban-born blacks] and inspire resentment among the poor whites with whom they 
competed for jobs.”91 Donald DeVore provides deeper analysis of this time period, adding that 
the African-American migration occurred because “many of them knew from personal 
experience that a reign of terror exists in many parts of the state,” evidenced by the more than 
two-hundred and thirty-two African-Americans who were lynched in Louisiana between 1882 
and 1903.
92
 The violence found its way into the city too; the 1900 Robert Charles riot in New 
Orleans left many dead or injured and convinced white New Orleans “that the maintenance of 
white supremacy demanded that additional Negroes suffer for [Charles’s] deeds.”93 The 
deterioration of African American rights and opportunities was symbolized by a small legal 
challenge over an 1890 Louisiana law regarding segregated railroad accommodations that grew 
into the Supreme Court case, Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). Louisianan Edward D. White, a man 
“who helped redeem Louisiana from Republican rule during Reconstruction,” was one of the 
Associate Justices who signed on to the majority opinion that upheld state-sponsored racial 
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segregation so long as the separate institutions were equal.
94
 The disfranchisement of African-
Americans in the new Constitution of 1898 further reinforced the notion that the state would 
offer no voice to a group that constituted twenty-seven percent of the city of New Orleans.
95
 This 
disfranchisement was part of the search for order, as elite white Louisianans applied it to 
stabilize and protect “traditional patterns of white political privilege” against “the actual exercise 
of the franchise by black citizens and the manipulation of the same by Bourbon oligarchs.”96 
The 1890s marked the beginning of the end for black horsemen, too, as Jim Crow 
solidified its hold on the South. “Jim Crow,” as historian Kevin Gaines defines it, was “the white 
South’s, and the nation’s, solution to the social advancement of a rising class of African 
Americans that threatened a polity founded on white supremacy.”97 The threat of social 
advancement by African Americans to white turfmen became increasingly pronounced, as 
evidenced by Isaac Murphy’s appeal. Three major shifts in American society in the 1890s 
reduced the prominence of the black jockey. First, the entrenchment of Jim Crow laws 
throughout the South limited the opportunities available to African-Americans. Second, the 
earliest stages of the First Great Migration not only featured black movement from the South to 
the North, but also from the rural areas to urban ones. Trapped within the city confines, young 
black men were unlikely to have the same exposure to horses and the world of the turf that their 
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predecessors did.
98
 Third, the attachment of large amounts of capital to the sport shut out the 
black horsemen. Some of them were able to negotiate the system and gain vast amounts of 
wealth, but many were unable to capitalize on their turf opportunities. The continued 
“incorporation of America” made it more difficult for the smaller stables of black horsemen to 
survive when they went up against racing conglomerates. Track official Joseph Murphy claimed 
that the black jockey disappeared because “when racing was in eclipse the great breeding farms 
of Kentucky where the Negro jockey was born and developed were broken up and the horses and 
employees scattered.”99 These three factors created a lost generation of black horsemen. 
Beginning in the 1890s, the young men who would otherwise be trained to join the world of the 
turf, embarked on other opportunities once they were excluded from the track. The 
disappearance of the black jockey would only be realized twenty years later as the remaining 
black horse men grew too old and retired. 
The rise and fall of Jimmy Lee, the most successful black jockey of this last generation, 
reveals the confluence of events that drove the black jockey off the track (see Figures 1 and 2). 
Born in Raceland, Louisiana, around 1890, Lee’s “fondness for the horse grew into a desire to 
become a jockey.”100 With his adept ability to handle a thoroughbred, he soon attracted the 
attention of the horsemen at the New Orleans Fair Grounds and earned a few mounts at the 
course. Against other racers, his riding was good but unexceptional, winning only twelve percent 
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of his mounts in 1906.
101
 Renowned horseman J.B. “Rome” Respess of Covington, Kentucky 
saw a real knack for speed in the young boy however and signed him to a $3,500 annual contract 
for first-call on his services, though Lee was still able to accept mounts as a free-lancer when 
Respess was not racing.
102
 
 
Figure 1: Jockey Jimmy Lee 
Credit: Keeneland-Cook Collection, Keeneland Library 
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Figure 2: Jimmy Lee at the Coney Island Jockey Club in 1908 
Credit: Keeneland-Hemment Collection, Keeneland Library 
 
Lee’s most famed race occurred on June 5, 1907, when he led six out of six horses on a 
six race card to victory at Churchill Downs.
103
 The Louisville Courier-Journal led its story by 
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stating that “when a mite of a negro boy, born and reared in the Southland, with all that this 
condition in life means, can hold spellbound thousands of people who are cultured and refined 
and educated, it stands to reason that this youngster of ebony hue has something which differs 
greatly from that which few human beings have.”104 After Lee won the first five races of the day, 
the crowd was agog at this young jockey, but the most remarkable race was the final one. The 
turf men believed that “Jockey Lee was a great rider in short-distanced events, but that he had 
poor judgment when it came to riding races of a mile or more.” The final race of the day was at a 
distance of a mile and three-eighths.
105
 Within the first quarter of a mile, Lee was able to pilot 
the horse, Foreigner, to a lead of more than a dozen lengths and won while “Foreigner at the 
finish was staggering like an inebriate.”106 It was his lead that allowed Lee to hold on just long 
enough to snatch victory from the competition as his black and orange dotted suit and white cap 
crossed the invisible wire. The final effort to bring Foreigner across the finish brought out the 
“generalship of this negro boy” as he began to ride with an effort “which people say is not 
human.”107 It was this “barbaric” effort that merited Jimmy Lee the nickname of “The Black 
Demon.” The Louisville Times reported that, with the success, “the negroes think Jockey Lee is 
under a hoodoo spell” and it “looked as if someone dusted him yesterday with ‘foofoo 
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powder.’”108 But Lee attributed his own success to his personal ambition “to be a greater jockey 
than was Isaac Murphy.”109 
That statement likely did not sit well with white Southern turfmen and jockeys. It was not 
long after his record-breaking day of racing at Churchill Downs that Lee saw the negative 
aspects of all the attention. While racing at Latonia, Lee won only one of two races that he 
should have won, as “he was shut off and impeded soon after the start and all through the 
stretch” when he was riding a heavy favorite.110 These crowding tactics continued to stifle Lee’s 
record. He began to develop concerns over discrimination on the track. There was “a great deal 
of talk about the white riders having banded together to ‘do’ Lee. While there may be no grounds 
for such talk, it has reached the negro boy’s ears and he gives every evidence of fright when in 
any sort of close quarters.”111 Lee also developed a habit of claiming fouls against other riders 
when he was bullied. After claiming that jockey Joe Notter had deliberately fouled him in May 
1908, the patrol judge stated that there was no evidence to uphold the claim (see Figure 3).
112
 
Despite there being no grounds to claim a clan of riders banding together, it was reported the 
next day that “jockey Lee is having a tough time of it among the white riders of the east. Dugan 
and Musgrave have harried him most, and Miller is expected to help from now on. Lee is a 
fighter himself, and that does not make matters easier.”113 It is notable that of the five jockeys in 
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the race where Lee claimed a foul against Notter, two of the other jockeys were Musgrave and 
Eddie Dugan, those who had been hounding him the most.
114
 
 
Figure 3: Charles R. Ellison presenting the Heaslip Cup to Jockey Joe Notter at the City Park 
Race Track in New Orleans on February 1, 1908 
Credit: Keeneland-Cook Collection, Keeneland Library  
 
During the late stages of his career, Lee began to receive fines as he became more 
aggressive on the track. During a race in Oakland, Lee and jockey Kirschbaum, while riding the 
two leading horses, began to duel each other with their whips. This not only led to fines for the 
two jockeys, but their distraction allowed another horse to pass them on the outside and win the 
race. Lee’s horse, Bon Homme, was the dominant betting horse, carrying “a small fortune in 
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wagers.” Lee’s whip tactics were the end of Bon Homme’s chances though, leading to “a storm 
of hisses from the spectators.”115 The fines were minimal compared to the punishment meted out 
to a steeplechase jockey who engaged in a whip duel previously; the $50 fine that Lee and 
Kirschbaum each received was nothing compared to steeplechase jockey E. Morrison’s thirty 
day suspension for dueling.
116
           
It is likely that Lee’s shift to the Canadian tracks in mid-1909 was a result of this track 
discrimination, although it should be noted that most American states, including Louisiana, had 
by this time banned race-track gambling and effectively, horse racing. Jockeys would often race 
against the same competitors at most of their meets, so it is significant that Lee was racing 
against a mostly different group of jockeys at these tracks; Musgrave was the only one of Lee’s 
usual harassers who shared the Canadian circuit with him. It seems simple to conclude that the 
prohibition of racetrack gambling in many states led to the closure of tracks and Lee’s move to 
the Canadian circuit, but this does not explain the situation entirely. Through the summer of 
1909, the top jockeys in the country (i.e. Vincent Powers, the best rider in the country, and Eddie 
Dugan, among others) were all racing the New York circuit, from Sheepshead Bay to Saratoga. 
With Lee’s record, he should have been among them on that profitable circuit. A good segment 
of those jockeys, however, were his main tormentors. They were still racing in New York when 
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Jimmy Lee moved down to the Kentucky circuit, racing at Churchill Downs in late September 
1909 alongside fellow black jockey Dale Austin.
117
 
Of greater impact on Jimmy Lee’s racing style was his history of injury. Lee experienced 
very few injuries in 1907, keeping himself in excellent shape. It was not until the end of the year 
that he had to sit out because of an injury, a wounded leg from a spill on December 10, 1907. On 
a heavy track – that is, an extremely wet one – struggle for position at the half-mile post led to a 
number of mud and dirt clods being thrown around, blinding multiple riders and forcing four 
mounts to the ground. The crowd at the New Orleans Fair Grounds was “in a high state of 
excitement in fear of several of the riders… having sustained fatal injuries,” but thankfully, all 
four riders survived. Two were merely shaken up, while the first rider to fall sustained internal 
injuries and Lee received severe bruising and a long laceration on his leg from the flailing of the 
fallen horses.
118
 He rode only ten mounts over the next two weeks, only one of which he rode in 
the money, placing third. Lee had other horses to be engaged, but he was unable to fulfill most of 
those engagements as his leg became sore, and his physician advised him to take a few more 
days off.
119
 Another major injury at the Kentucky Derby on May 5, 1908, would curtail his 
riding career. Lee had the mount on Lillian Ray in the second race of the day, but a jam just 
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outside the post caused Lillian Ray to fall, throwing Lee and injuring his shoulder.
120
 Lee was 
unable to ride in the Kentucky Derby race because of the accident, “smothering the hopes” of his 
mount’s owner, Barney Dreyfuss, who “thought he would have a chance with Jimmy Lee up.”121 
While the Louisville Herald wrote that “nothing serious is expected to result” from the fall, Lee 
was still feeling the effects a week later as he was “riding under difficulties at Churchill Downs, 
and can scarcely lift his right arm over his head.”122 Lee would continue to race, but his 
performance after this injury would decline dramatically.
123
 
Given the rough riding which haunted him and his assessment that he was being ganged 
up on, Lee likely had developed a fear of injury as indicated by some of his tactics during later 
races. During a race in Oakland, he lost on the “almost invulnerable Jeanne d’Arc” when “she 
was pulled up sharply and lost second place.” Questioned as to why he did so, Lee stated that 
jockey Butler was riding “so close that he was forced to pull up to avoid going over the inner 
fence.”124 Lee’s situation is likely similar to that of jockey Delaby, who after a fall at City Park 
in New Orleans, “absolutely refuses to take a chance at guiding his mount through an opening 
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when it is probable that he will be jostled or bumped in doing so.”125 Lee faced a barrage of 
psychic and physical violence on the track that only increased as he became more famous. The 
speed that characterized his racing style led to a greater potential for injury when he was run into 
the pack or the rail. The overt attacks he endured on and off the track, in addition to his increased 
timidity in the saddle made it less likely that Lee would receive mounts. The bureaucratic 
indifference and tacit consent of the Jockey Club for the rough riding tactics turned both Lee and 
the horses he rode into targets. Lee’s ability to receive favored mounts was further limited by the 
influence of money on the sport because turfmen preferred to protect their investments. Any of 
Lee’s late career victories relied mostly on his ability to drive the horse rather than on the ability 
of the horse itself. Lee’s experience demonstrates the influence of Jim Crow, the modern ideals 
of the sport promoted by the Jockey Club, and the reformist spirit which limited the opportunities 
for horsemen as the key aspects that contributed to the disappearance of the black jockey. 
Aspects of Lee’s experience can be seen in histories of the black horsemen on the turf, all 
trying to identify why the black jockey disappeared. David Wiggins claims that white jockeys 
formed “anticolored unions” and began to drive black riders off the track in the 1890s.126 
Unfortunately, Wiggins cannot sustain his claim with evidence relating to the track, but he uses 
examples from other sports leagues to show the united efforts of racism. In New Orleans, for 
example, the cyclists of the League of American Wheelmen threated to leave in the 1890s 
because the league admitted black members in the North.
127
 Arthur Ashe, Jr., seconds the charge 
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of racism, claiming that “the Jockey Club was formed in 1894 to license riders, and they 
systematically denied the relisting of blacks. The ebony-skinned riders were just too good and 
made too much money to suit the whites in charge.”128 Charles Parmer also agrees, stating that 
“the white boys retaliated by ganging up against the black riders on the rails. A black boy would 
be pocketed, thrust back in a race; or his mount would be bumped out of contention on a white 
boy’s stirrup, and toss him out of the saddle.”129 Parmer also noted that “those white fellows 
would slash out and cut the nearest Negro rider,” such that “they literally ran the black boys off 
the track.”130 As the African-American jockeys were literally crowded out of the field, it became 
more difficult for them to receive contracts, or better terms on their contracts, because the 
owners knew that the system was doing nothing to protect the jockeys. When African-American 
jockeys spoke out against the aggressive tactics of the white jockeys, they were denounced by 
the Jockey Clubs and forced out of the sport, as in the case of Leroy Williams. Williams had 
trouble winning many races by 1907 as he had “to steer clear of the ‘pockets’ and snares that the 
white boys set.”131 The racial motivations were ignored by newspapers like the Washington Post 
which instead applied theories of Social Darwinism, viewing the “white jockeys’ superior 
intelligence” as the reason why the “negro rider [was] on [the] wane.”132 These anecdotes only 
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provide one aspect of the story though. The modernizing influences of the sport and the reformist 
elements were just as important as racism and violence in why the black jockey disappeared. 
 Antebellum Southern white turfmen were content in their domination of black slave 
horsemen that they could allow them numerous privileges without lessening their own authority. 
Any slave success on the track would belong to them and affect their social standings. Thus the 
world of white turfmen was dependent upon the subordination and labor of black men. After 
emancipation, white turfmen tried to control the message still, practicing disavowal of black 
talent, in their “simultaneous acknowledging and denying an event,” as a way to “reject its 
relevance, knowing full well that it occurred.”133 They acknowledged the existence of black 
talent in horse racing, but denied that black horsemen’s achievements meant anything other than 
upholding racial hierarchies. Isaac Murphy’s success, but more importantly, the manner in which 
he achieved it, forced Southerners to rethink their worldview. Fearing that they could no longer 
control the yearning for respect and dignity that diffused from Murphy to the African-American 
community, white turfmen in the north and south reconciled their differences and forced the 
black turfmen out of the visible track roles. As Ray Stannard Baker eloquently noted, white 
southern men “want the New South, but the Old Negro.”134 The fears of Southern white men 
about the implications of black success on the track did not just reflect how they viewed African-
Americans, but also revealed insecurities regarding their own place in society in a rapidly 
modernizing and urbanizing world. The class conflicts and realignments that occurred in white 
Southern society, in addition to the modernization and industrialization of the South, helped 
unite turfmen nationally. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
A BETTER BREED OF HORSES:  
CLASS CONFLICT, MODERNIZATION, AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF 
HORSE RACING 
 
On the day after the ninety-fifth anniversary of Henry Clay’s birth, the Clay monument 
located on Canal Street, where it intersected St. Charles Avenue and Royal Street, was the 
centerpoint of a vibrant scene in New Orleans.
1
 But the throngs gathered around the monument 
on Saturday, April 13, 1872, were not there to pay tribute to Clay. The open nature of the circular 
carriageway surrounding the monument was designed to maximize the visibility of the 
commemorative statue on the major thoroughfare.
2
 As such, the Louisiana Jockey Club 
designated it as the waypoint for all those heading to its inaugural race meeting at the New 
Orleans Fair Grounds. Droves of carriages and street cars loitered around the monument, 
ferrying passengers to the track with “cars leaving from Clay Statue every five minutes during 
the races.”3 Novelist George Washington Cable remarked that on Canal Street one could see both 
“the gay carriage-parties turn northwestward scurrying away to the races” as well as “the 
gambler [who] seeks whom he may induce to walk around into his parlor in the Rue Royale or 
St. Charles Street.”4 Journalist Charles Henry White added that “race track touts, bookmakers, 
jockeys,” and “commercial travelers” are also among those the visitor might see on Canal 
Street.
5
 Clay’s monument served as an appropriate location because of his legacy of breeding 
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horses at his Ashland Plantation, as well as his proclivity for gambling. John Quincy Adams 
remarked that “in politics, as in private life, Clay is essentially a Gamester.”6 This location was 
even more apt given Clay’s economic program, the American System, which was intended to 
unite the nation through economic development and specialization, a process that was also 
occurring in the world of the turf by 1872.  
Subscribing to a growing national standard in order to attract Northern sportsmen and 
capital, a rising class of professional sportsmen changed the nature of the Southern system of 
racing. The attempts by the planter aristocracy in the postbellum period to restore the glory of 
New Orleans racing served to advance the prospects of a burgeoning component of the middle 
class: the professional sportsman. This sportsman was born of the “culture of chance,” 
considered by historian Jackson Lears to be one of the driving forces of post-Civil War 
American society, and identified as a “culture more at ease with randomness and irrationality, 
more doubtful that diligence is the only path to success,” reaffirmed and magnified by the Civil 
War.
7
 The destruction wrought by the Civil War did not harm this risk-driven culture. Instead, it 
created vast opportunities to be exploited as “the unsettled economy offered unprecedented 
rewards for risk” since “the culture of chance continued to draw legitimacy from the indiscipline 
of the market.”8 The men successfully benefitting from the commercial culture in New Orleans 
were not the old plantation elite but entrepreneurs, professional gamblers, and professional 
sportsmen, among others. These professional turfmen implemented more democratic ideals that 
modernized the Southern racing circuit, distancing it from the antebellum era when racing 
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constituted an extension of elite Southern honor. The professionalization and modernization of 
horse racing by the turfmen after 1865 demonstrates the integration of New Orleans into the 
national economy, enlisting the promises of the New South to accomplish their goals. Just as 
Clay’s American System advocated an economic connection throughout the nation, so too did 
the turfmen reconnect New Orleans to the nation through the sport of horse racing. 
As with the experience of African-Americans in Louisianan horse racing, the context for 
the changing status of horse owners and turfmen begins with the Old South. In the antebellum 
period, racing in New Orleans was primarily the pastime of the white planter aristocracy. For the 
horse owners, there was little financial incentive to win races as the purses were small, but there 
was an intense competition to prove oneself the better horse breeder. The planters considered 
themselves “amateur sportsmen,” as their participation was based on rituals of honor, pride in 
their accomplishments, and the love of the game. They contrasted themselves against the much-
reviled “professional sportsman, who participated in sports based on shows of wealth, profit in 
their accomplishments, and the love of money. Money did serve a purpose to the antebellum 
planter aristocracy, but they did not participate in the world of the turf out of financial motives. 
For the men of the antebellum iteration of the Metairie Jockey Club, horse racing and gambling 
provided a method of muting rivalries and defending Southern honor. As historian Bertram 
Wyatt-Brown describes, “money in the context of the game or sport served as a means to ratify 
obligation and deference, not to terminate them, no matter how cheerily the winnings jangled in 
the pockets of the bettor.”9 Historian T.H. Breen, in a study of colonial Virginia, also argues that 
even though betting allowed the planters to “openly [express] their extreme competitiveness, 
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winning temporary emblematic victories over their rivals,” it still served to reduce the 
“dangerous, but often inevitable social tensions” inherent in a colonial plantation society, 
“without thereby threatening the social tranquility of Virginia.”10 Not to take part in this 
community of men would be seen as anti-social and set one apart from the community. Racing 
was unique, though, in the way that it merged the recreation of the upper classes with that of the 
masses, allowing it to serve as a performance of social power. “An intensely shared interest,” in 
horse racing and other sports among a community, “crossing but not leveling social distinctions, 
has powerful effects in transmitting style and reinforcing the leadership of the elite that controls 
proceedings and excels in the display."
11
 Beginning with the turfmen of the Southern planter 
aristocracy, the track was an “institution that defined who they were or who they wished to 
become,” establishing their belief in “the necessity of hierarchy to make a great and modern 
United States and how hard they were willing to work to protect social divisions and 
inequalities.”12 
The world of antebellum horse racing as described by Wyatt-Brown and Breen certainly 
fit Adelman’s characteristics of the premodern ideal sporting type. The competition was 
generally local in nature, with very few dedicated sporting journals and newspapers reporting on 
most of the contests.
13
 With no enduring record of the race for posterity, the significance of 
honor in these games was amplified since it was “relayed to the ephemerality of the glory 
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attached to winning. To delay payment robbed the winner of the immediate gratification of his 
trophy, the emblematic value of which lasted only as long as public memory of the occasion.” 14 
There was also little role differentiation between players and spectators. The men of the Metairie 
Jockey Club, demonstrating the greater fluidity of roles on the track, transitioned between 
participant and spectator easily and were just as likely to ride their own horses as they were to 
have jockeys ride them. In the areas of organization and rules, the Metairie Jockey Club was 
already moving toward the modern ideal sporting type, as a formal organization with a codified 
rulebook. Unlike the later formulation, at this time, club racing was primarily a local affair, 
inconsistent with other regional clubs in organization and rules. One of the rules that varied 
depending on region regarded the length and style of the race. No consistency existed between 
races, and distance varied widely, as horses ran multiple heats of one to four miles.
15
 Variations 
in rules between locales therefore forced the planters to breed their horses not only for speed, but 
also for endurance. Betting was also a local, private matter between two people. Professional 
gamblers did exist, but on average, the gentlemen’s bets outnumbered those of the professional, 
and few gentlemen would consent to accept a professional’s bet. Some trends toward the modern 
ideal were beginning to occur as early as the 1850s, but they were not internal shifts, instead 
implemented by men outside of the Southern gentry. 
 One of the men integral in moving the New Orleans tracks toward the modern ideal was 
Northern racing promoter, Richard Ten Broeck. The great eastern races began to decline in the 
1840s because of the influence of anti-gambling reformers and the temperance movement. The 
northern and eastern horsemen sought new areas to continue racing, luckily arriving in the lower 
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Mississippi during the height of antebellum development in the Louisiana sugar region.
16
 In the 
1850s, New Orleans became the new leader of the turf, known as the “horse-racing capital of the 
nation” with five tracks open during the winter season.17 The Metairie Course, built in 1838, was 
the most successful of the early New Orleans tracks. Its success fluctuated over the following 
years, so in 1851, the owners of the track hired Richard Ten Broeck, a New York promoter, to 
supervise the Metairie track. Ten Broeck recognized opportunity in New Orleans and used his 
connections on the track to raise his own social profile. His modifications would be instrumental 
in establishing many of the modern influences in New Orleans, but his role as a professional 
sportsman put him at odds with the Southern gentry and their emphasis on honor culture. 
Born in Albany, New York, in 1812, Richard Ten Broeck, after an unsuccessful year at 
West Point, resolved to start a career in horse racing. He ignored the traditional racing circles in 
New York, New Jersey, and the upper South, setting his eyes on the banks of the Mississippi 
River to make his mark on the turf. Natchez politician and turfman Adam L. Bingaman hired Ten 
Broeck in 1848 to manage his newly-established Bingaman Course, across the river from New 
Orleans. From there, he was promoted to manager of the Metairie Course under the auspices of 
the Metairie Association, a joint-stock company that purchased a controlling interest in the 
track.
18
 Ten Broeck’s methods improved the national prestige of New Orleans racing, turning the 
Metairie into a prominent track that attracted leading stables of the North and upper South. He 
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improved the track, built new stables to house more horses, increased the size of purses through 
the contributions of local merchants and businessmen, and rebuilt the grandstand, adding 
embellishments like parlors in the ladies’ stand. Despite the massive success of his additions, he 
still struggled for complete acceptance, and "in New Orleans, as elsewhere, the dramatic pattern 
of Ten Broeck's life was that of the outsider, alone, pitting his judgment and nerve against 
everybody else's in duels in which the weapons were horses."
19
 
 The most famous of Ten Broeck’s “horse duels” was also one of the most famous horse 
races in New Orleans – the classic rivalry between the two great horses, Lexington and Lecomte. 
In their first match-up in the Great Post Stakes, twenty thousand people, including former 
President Millard Fillmore, witnessed these two famous horses race at the Metairie Course on 
April 1, 1854. Thomas J. Wells ran Lecomte, representing Mississippi against Richard Ten 
Broeck’s horse, Lexington, representing Kentucky.20 Lexington won two straight four-mile heats 
over Lecomte that day. Wells requested a rematch, confident that his horse would prove its worth 
in another race, and entered Lecomte to race again the following week. “As a shareholder in the 
Metairie Course, [Ten Broeck] stood to gain a hefty sum in gate receipts from a rematch,” and 
was inclined to accept Well’s offer. 21 But Ten Broeck was only a part-owner of Lexington, and 
the other partners preferred to rest the horse after such a grueling match. In a move that would 
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only encourage later accusations that he was a gamester, emphasizing personal profit, Ten 
Broeck proceeded to buy out his partners and returned Lexington to the training track. Historian 
John Dizikes concurs in that assessment, asserting that even though Lexington seemed unfit for a 
second race so soon, Ten Broeck had “a gambler's talent for building the pot.” 22 He “must have 
calculated that he was not really risking much. If [Lexington] won, his owner would have to look 
for new opponents; but if he lost, a third and payoff meeting would be set up. Ten Broeck might 
actually gain more by losing."
23
  
 Thomas J. Wells wanted to ensure his victory in the rematch. Advised by fellow planter 
William J. Minor, Wells hired the slave trainer Hark, known for his expertise in preparing 
horses. Wells then went to fellow Louisianan Duncan F. Kenner and hired out Kenner’s slave 
jockey, Abe, known for a wild competitive spirit on the New Orleans and Natchez tracks. Facing 
his rival again on April 8, 1854, now jockeyed by Abe and trained by Hark, Lecomte avenged his 
earlier defeat and won two heats over Lexington. The first was only by a slim margin, though 
Lecomte set a four-mile record of seven minutes, twenty-six seconds in that race. The second 
race established a slower time, but a greater margin of victory.
24
 Ten Broeck vehemently argued 
that Lexington would have won if his jockey had not mistakenly pulled up at the three-mile 
mark, misjudging the race distance. Challenging Lecomte to a final match to determine true 
superiority, Ten Broeck attempted to convince Wells to assent to the race. Wells consistently 
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refused the challenge, and the two men took to the pages of the Spirit of the Times as their 
arguments grew increasingly bitter. Ten Broeck decided to goad Wells by putting up $10,000 
that Lexington, running solely against the clock, could beat Lecomte’s record time. On April 2, 
1855, Lexington sustained his claim, demolishing Lecomte’s record at Metairie and shaving six 
seconds off the latter horse’s time. Having been called out in that manner, Wells could no longer 
ignore Ten Broeck’s challenge; the third, and ultimate, race was scheduled for April 14, two 
weeks later. It was no contest, however, and Lexington ran away with victory over a thoroughly 
outclassed Lecomte. It was this third race that supported Wells’ belief that Lecomte had been 
drugged and led to the subsequent investigation by Wells, Minor, and Kenner into the lives of the 
black horsemen. 
Despite the improvements that Ten Broeck established at Metairie and his role in one of 
the greatest rivalries of the Old South, the Southern planter aristocracy still did not accept the 
Albany sportsman as one of their fraternity. Ten Broeck’s profit motives in the Lexington-
Lecomte series, along with the fact that as a professional, he “lived on what he made as a 
gamesman at the track,” did not endear him to the Southern gentry who viewed themselves as 
amateur sportsmen.
25
 To them, Ten Broeck was not a “high minded liberal gentleman, attached 
to amusements regardless of loss or gain,” but rather a “socially despised” gamester. 26 Ten 
Broeck retired Lexington to stud soon after the last race with Lecomte, then purchased the latter 
horse from Wells. Parting ways with the Metairie Jockey Club by 1856, Ten Broeck crossed the 
Atlantic with a stable full of horses to try and dominate the British turf with what he thought to 
be a superior breed of horse. His departure from the Metairie club and his falling out with the 
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Metairie planters was partly because of a personality clash, seen in vicious attacks by the two 
men in the turf newspapers, as well as Ten Broeck’s rejection of ideals of Southern honor. The 
schism was exacerbated in mid-1857 when Ten Broeck wrote an open letter in a sporting journal 
calling out former Governor and President of the Club, Paul Octave Hebert, and William J. 
Minor, accusing them of conspiring to impede his stable’s progress because they had “always 
[attempted] to deny and calumniate the pedigrees, performances, and reputation of [Ten 
Broeck’s] horses.”27 
 Richard Ten Broeck thus embodied the professional sportsman to the Southern gentlemen 
of New Orleans, but the changes he implemented at Metairie and in the sport presaged the 
modern trends that would follow during the reconstruction of the southern turf. He was a self-
promoter and made use of telegraph technology to broadcast the news of Lexington’s races. 
Lexington’s earnings were published in newspapers too, and people eagerly discussed the 
$56,000 that Lexington won throughout his career.
28
 The scheme to coerce Thomas Wells into 
agreeing to a final race by racing Lexington against the clock and beating Lecomte’s record was 
an impressive strategy. Dizikes considers the “showmanship of the huge bet staked on breaking 
the world’s record” to be brilliant in that “it wasn’t a private bet, it was a public event. It became 
as much the focus of talk as the horses and their races.”29 In many respects, Ten Broeck’s 
strategy can be read as a “pseudo-event,” to use Daniel Boorstin’s phrase – a media event for the 
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sake of gaining public attention.
30
 In addition, by using the clock as the opponent in such a 
publicized event, it was a giant leap toward the establishment of speed alone as the measure of a 
horse’s achievement, not endurance. The modern-thinking turfman was not a new phenomenon 
after the Civil War, but had long been present in some capacity in the Southern world of horse 
racing. It was not until the diminished power of the planter aristocracy in the postbellum years, 
however, that the rising professional turfman was able to gain enough power to reshape the sport. 
 William Minor, like many other slaveholders in the deep South, aligned himself with 
Whig politics. Any political issue was viewed through his role as both slaveholder and sugar 
planter. The most important policies for him included preserving slavery and imposing a 
protective tariff on sugar. Minor “firmly opposed secession, not only because he was deeply 
attached to the Union, but also because he was convinced that such an act would be disastrous to 
the sugar industry of the South.”31 This view was prevalent among most of the planter 
aristocracy who were invested in the world of the Southern turf. In Natchez, as well as in 
Louisiana, these men had extensive Northern and foreign investments in addition to their 
mercantile, manufacturing, and banking interests.
32
 Thomas J. Wells’s brother, James Madison 
Wells, who would become the Reconstruction governor of Louisiana and another Louisiana race 
horse man, actively opposed secession, even leading a “band of Unionist guerillas that attacked 
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Confederate train wagons.”33 With war on the horizon, the Spirit of the Times urged that it was in 
the best interests for Southern men of the turf to avoid bloodshed. 
 But the war came. When war seemed inevitable, Southern turfmen generally changed 
their attitudes toward the war. In an expression of the patriotic fervor of some Confederates in 
Louisiana, one race track attendee conveyed his joy at seeing a Virginia horse lose to an 
underdog at the New Orleans track, saying that it was a just punishment for Virginia’s lateness in 
declaring war. There were early hopes of the continuation of racing in the South. The Charleston 
Daily Courier reported in 1862 that a Confederate alternative to New York’s Spirit of the Times 
would soon commence publication, claiming it would be “much needed at the South, as soon as 
we achieve our independence.”34 These hopes were soon dashed though, and the Metairie Jockey 
Club cancelled its 1862 meet when Union troops were moving towards New Orleans. The city 
fell to Federal occupation several weeks later. 
The swift Union capture of New Orleans in April 1862 led to an extended occupation and 
martial law administered by Major General Benjamin Butler, whose occupation force attempted 
to alter the leisure habits of New Orleans. To bring the lenient Sabbath standards in New Orleans 
in line with those of New England, Butler’s successor, General Nathaniel Banks, in December 
1864 implemented General Orders Number 179 that outlawed attendance at “Theaters, Billiard 
Rooms, and other places of amusement on Sunday.”35 The Federal troops enforced these orders 
during the occupation, but they did not permanently alter the traditions of leisure in New 
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Orleans. When Federal troops finally left the city, their efforts to purify the morality of New 
Orleans were quickly disregarded. To many Southerners, leisure was to be their escape from the 
stresses of occupation. 
 The prestige that the New Orleans tracks enjoyed in the 1850s disappeared with the onset 
of hostilities. Many antebellum race horses served as Confederate cavalry mounts. The horses 
that were not conscripted into service were not assured of safety. The Federal occupation and 
seizure of war contraband from the planters devastated the local infrastructure for racing. Duncan 
Kenner and William Minor were the two largest turfmen who lost their Louisiana plantation and 
racing assets. Kenner’s stables were raided by Federal troops in August 1862, and they 
confiscated every horse, with the exception of Whale, a Thoroughbred so wild that they left him 
behind when they were unable to restrain him. Minor’s plantation, Waterloo, was raided next, 
though he would eventually have most of his confiscated property returned to him. His horses, 
however, never returned to Waterloo, having been shipped up north to be auctioned off for the 
purposes of improving the northern stock with their noble blood lines.
36
 The greatest damage to 
the Southern turf was not the loss of the aristocratic Thoroughbred blood lines, but the loss of the 
skilled labor of slave horsemen who trained, exercised, and rode them. Racing in Louisiana and 
the South was almost entirely halted during the Civil War, though it did continue in Kentucky 
and the Northern states. 
 The confiscation of wealth, property, and land from the planter aristocracy of Louisiana 
dealt a major blow to the power of the Southern turfmen. The war also devastated Louisiana’s 
financial and agricultural sectors, but unlike neighboring states, Louisiana lacked outside capital 
and investment to revive the economy. The “state’s notorious political instability [frightened] off 
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many potential investors during Reconstruction,” and “New Orleans elites continued to resist the 
importation of northern capital.”37 The Times-Picayune expressed this stubborn attitude, arguing 
in 1878 that the independent spirit of Louisiana “can save herself, and stand alone, without a 
dollar of capital from other states.”38 As early as 1866 though, the Times-Picayune wrote (with 
no sense of irony) that “the great influx of strangers to our city is one of the principal reasons 
that our amusement resorts are nightly filled,” amusements that included “gambling hells.”39 In a 
message that the turfmen took to heart, a writer for Wilkes’ Spirit of the Times mused that 
perhaps racing “was to be a means rather than an effect of recuperation at the South.”40  
Sports in New Orleans often highlighted the class tensions that divided the state. Horse 
racing was unique in this regard because it merged the recreation of the upper classes with that of 
the masses. From Reconstruction through the fin de siècle, the formation of multiple jockey 
clubs offered Louisianans differing visions of how racing might be organized in the city. 
Antebellum planters and Southern horsemen reactivated the Metairie Jockey Club in 1865. Its 
leaders included Governor James Madison Wells and former Governor Paul Octave Hebert. 
After his service as governor, from 1856 to 1860, Hebert returned to his sugar plantation and his 
role as president of the Metairie Jockey Club, where he remained for “several years before and 
many after the war.”41 Although the club met with initial success, demonstrating the desire of the 
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people to return to normalcy, the club was unable to prosper. The lack of strong local stables 
from which to draw horses was a major detriment to the club’s success. The Metairie Jockey 
Club, drawing most of its membership from the antebellum planter class, sought to reconstruct 
the racial and class hierarchies that they feared were being undermined by the psychic pains of 
Southern defeat. They segregated their grandstands into three distinct sections:  one for club 
members, one for ladies, and one for general admission – including black spectators – thereby, 
reinforcing class standing and protecting the virtues of southern white womanhood. These older 
members took a conservative view of the sport, believing that racing should remain under the 
rule of the elites and the performance of the races would “[reinforce] the leadership of the elite 
that controls proceedings and excels in the display.” 42 The younger members of the club 
disagreed with that view and saw the future of racing in wider marketing to all classes of society. 
While both factions believed the race track would be a means to restore New Orleans to its 
former glory by reconstructing their ideal society through track policies, the methods they 
advocated to achieve that goal differed. Comparable to the problems identified by E. Digby 
Baltzell in his analysis of white Anglo-Saxon Protestant elites and power structures, the failings 
of the Metairie Jockey Club came from their “unwillingness, or inability, to share and improve 
its upper-class traditions by continually absorbing talented and distinguished members of 
minority groups into its privileged ranks.”43 These divisions intensified, leading to a schism in 
1871 over the membership application of Charles T. Howard. 
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Howard founded and served as president of the Louisiana Lottery Company, the 
corporation that ran one of the only legal lotteries in the United States, raking in fortunes for its 
organizers. As the chief officer of the lottery, Howard developed relationships with key 
Republican lawmakers to ensure the exclusivity and continued existence of the Louisiana 
Lottery, since lotteries were falling under state prohibition elsewhere. Part of Howard’s strategy 
was “investing” a portion of the profits in certain state legislators, giving bribes for assurances 
that the lottery would remain legal. The close connections Howard formed with the state’s 
Reconstruction-era Republican Party led the older members of the Metairie Jockey Club to snub 
him, deriding him as both a carpetbagger and a scalawag.
44
 Howard vowed to bury the Metairie 
course for the slight, and he formed the rival Louisiana Jockey Club which drew away many 
younger members from the Metairie Jockey Club. In 1872, Howard purchased the grounds of the 
Metairie Course and turned it into the Metairie Cemetery, literally burying the racetrack of the 
Metairie Jockey Club.
45
 Purchasing the New Orleans Fair Grounds for its home turf, the 
Louisiana Jockey Club argued for a noble democratic foundation of the sport, stating that the 
“racing interests of the South cannot be subservient to any little clique of people.” 
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The Louisiana Jockey Club used the rhetoric of democratic idealism, but the members 
still remained cognizant of their own high social status and retained many of the trappings of 
elite social organizations. Meanwhile, they lowered the price of grandstand and infield 
admission. The new club modified the racial segregation of the Metairie Jockey Club by 
allowing blacks in the public grandstand, though it still barred them from the quarter stretch.
46
 
Large public support for racing allowed the track to weather the Panic of 1873 with the 
Louisiana Jockey Club netting $9,000 in profit from the 1875 spring meet alone.
47
 As with the 
struggles of the Metairie Jockey Club, any prosperity was merely illusory since the club grappled 
with massive debt incurred from the purchase and later renovation of the Fair Grounds. Seeing 
their only recourse as a massive reduction in purse size, which would diminish the quality of 
racing, the members of the Louisiana Jockey Club, out of a professed respect for the ideals of the 
sport, opted to disband instead, which they did following the 1878 spring meet. 
Despite the interruption in commerce that followed the Civil War and the Panic of 1873, 
by the late 1870s and 1880s, the economy of New Orleans began to show signs of massive 
revitalization. Most important to this revitalization was the reunification of Northern and 
Southern business interests and the connections developed between them through the world of 
the turf. The devastation of the Southern turf in the immediate aftermath of the war, combined 
with the seizure of Southern horses and the continuation of Northern racing throughout the war, 
shifted the balance of power in the sport north of the Mason-Dixon line. William J. Minor visited 
Jerome Park in New York, then under construction, and announced that he “trusted that the 
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completion of the Park would inaugurate a brighter era of the Turf.”48 The Spirit of the Times 
argued for the role of the turf “as a Means of Restoring cordial Relations,” adding that “neither 
legislative enactments, nor the operations of commerce, nor the dealings of finance, are, in our 
opinion, as effective towards the restoration of real, frank, cordial, good feeling as the gathering 
together of many able and influential men from most of the States at the great race meetings.”49 
The rise and subsequent decline of black liberties after the Civil War were facilitated by the 
reconciliation of Northern and Southern turfmen as the “racing men of the 1870s created in 
miniature at the track the political and economic structures they favored, and they strengthened 
the bonds of camaraderie and common interest that could give their models formative power on a 
national scale.”50  
These new men who controlled the turf were not from the antebellum southern 
aristocracy, but were industrialists, merchants, railroadmen, and other barons of industry – men 
who viewed the Jockey Clubs and the world of the turf as a necessary aspect of elite social life. 
As argued by Nicola Beisel, “the aim of the capitalist was not to accumulate as much capital as 
possible, but to establish a family embraced by the socially elect.”51 When the Jockey Club of 
New York was established, its chairman, August Belmont Jr., governed the association with the 
attitude that “racing is for the rich,” ignoring the fact that the sport depended upon the track-
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going public for its continued success.
52
 Matt J. Winn of the American Turf Association would 
characterize the membership of the Jockey Club as “made up of blue-bloods, most of them 
enormously wealthy with racing as their hobby, and many of them owned huge stables of 
thoroughbreds.”53 Since the elite status of racing was upheld, it was viewed as a vehicle for 
middle-class men who hoped to gain social mobility and for the elite industrialists who wanted to 
establish greater connections. The sport still retained the image of the racing man as that of “the 
genial, high-styled, fun-loving planter,” and the men who attached themselves to the sport either 
“clung to the traditions of their own upper-class ancestors” or created an image of themselves as 
“planters of the old school,” like so “many [of them] with more questionable pedigrees.”54 The 
powerful belief in a strong hereditary thoroughbred bloodline led to a considerable increase in 
stud fees as these industrialists attempted to purchase success at the track.
55
 The entrance of these 
men into the sport reinforced the rich and elite nature of the turf. 
As industrial control over politics grew, the Northern businessmen and white Southerners 
reconciled, placing their joint economic concerns over the racial concerns of the nation. August 
Belmont, serving as the chairman of the Democratic National Committee in 1871, used his 
connections at the race track to facilitate the creation of a new Democratic union. Recognizing 
Delaware Senator Thomas Bayard, Jr., as the potential presidential candidate to lead this united 
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Democratic party, Belmont hoped that Bayard’s nomination would bring together a coalition of 
white Southerners who opposed Reconstruction, rich Northern industrialists who opposed 
government interference, and the immigrants who formed the heart of Democratic city machine 
politics.
56
 Belmont’s association with Bayard came from their shared track experiences; Bayard 
had served as a race judge at Saratoga in 1871, with the assistance of Louisianans Duncan F. 
Kenner and Paul O. Hebert.
57
 United in their belief that the excesses of freedom needed to be 
contained, Northern and Southern turfmen asserted the necessity of order and hierarchy in 
accomplishing that end and establishing white unity. William Minor endorsed this belief when he 
defended the competitiveness of Louisiana sugar, despite the use of free labor, saying that “if we 
could get rid of Northern interference with the freedmen, I think we could arrange matters so as 
to obtain at least one half as much labor as we did before… if we can get a proportionate income 
and price, we may do, in a pecuniary sense, as well as ever. But the satisfaction of planting on a 
well regulated plantation is gone.”58 The implementation of Jim Crow laws was a way to 
legislate racial order. Historian Leon Litwack argues that Jim Crow was a “response to fears of a 
new generation of blacks unschooled in racial etiquette and to growing doubts that this 
generation could be trusted to stay in its place without legal force.”59 These beliefs relied on the 
dissemination and acceptance of Lost Cause mythology in order to implement more narrowly 
defined racial hierarchies. 
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Part of the regional reconciliation was the development of the Lost Cause mythology that 
allowed Southerners to idolize the Confederate ideals and the myth of fidelity and bonds between 
former masters and slaves. Lost Cause supporters eagerly recounted the story of Robert E. Lee’s 
horse, Traveller, after Lee’s death in 1870. When Lee’s daughter told a black stable boy to take 
the horse out for exercise, the horse refused to let the boy near it, despite having been docile for 
Lee. It was only when a white Texas collegiate mounted Traveller that the horse calmed down 
and became compliant.
60
 The truth of the story is unimportant, since Traveller would have likely 
had black horsemen around him his whole life. But just as John Gilmer Speed claimed that an 
unruly horse would calm at the touch of its master’s hand, this story revealed that even the horses 
of Confederate heroes knew who was allowed to master them. Like Abe’s return to his former 
master, the most important part of Traveller’s story was the message. Robert E. Lee was not 
alone in the pantheon of Lost Cause symbols. In death, even his horse was reunited with him as a 
symbol of racial hierarchy. 
Despite the previous failures of the Metairie and Louisiana Jockey Clubs, public desire 
for racing persisted unabated. Jockey Clubs, however, could not long survive as independent 
franchises if they continued to operate under the same traditions as the Metairie and Louisiana 
Jockey Clubs. A successful jockey club needed not only something special to differentiate it 
from the other race courses, but also an even higher profit margin to ensure that purses remained 
large and the leading stables participated. The New Louisiana Jockey Club formed in 1879, 
funded by civic leaders like Robert Simmons and G. W. Nott, attempted to capture that special 
spark. There was a reciprocal relationship between the facility renovation and technological 
innovation the club adopted and the profit from their commercial efforts. The entrepreneurs of 
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the New Louisiana Jockey Club "required superior stadium facilities in order to increase the sale 
of viewing privileges and thereby maximize return from their investment in professional sport, 
while the resultant outlay on building and rise in fixed costs - maintenance, capital depreciation, 
and ground rental - demanded that additional revenue be received from spectators."
61
 The club 
believed the recognition of this relationship was the solution to the problems that plagued 
previous post-war clubs. Taking a chance on this belief, club members spent all of their 
resources on a single spring meet. That meet proved so successful that the turfmen of the New 
Louisiana Jockey Club were able to purchase the Fair Grounds outright after their third season. 
While this initial success reflects more on the public demand for racing, the consequent changes 
initiated by the New Louisiana Jockey Club were instrumental in allowing them to implement 
ideals of modernization, professionalization, and order in the sport. 
Technological changes and urbanization were major components of the modernization of 
horse racing in the late nineteenth century. Historian John Rickards Betts argues, "urbanization 
brought forth the need for commercialized spectator sports, while industrialization gradually 
provided the standard of living and leisure time so vital to the support of all forms of 
recreation."
62
 The New Louisiana Jockey Club charted the course of New Orleans horse racing 
during an era of great technological innovation, consistently implementing new technology to 
improve the tracks and amenities. The introduction of a new style of electronic starting gates 
ensured a fair start to the races and helped defend against accusations of cheating. When 
planning commenced for the 1884 World’s Fair in New Orleans, the club hoped to earn 
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sponsorship for any racing needs because of the “large area, spacious buildings, and … a steam 
engine” at the Fair Grounds.63 The success of the tracks among all classes of people generally 
derived from their locations near streetcar and rail lines and their influence on those companies 
to expand transportation networks.
 64
 The New Louisiana Jockey Club struck a deal with the 
street railroad companies in 1882 “to extend their lines into the Fair Grounds for the convenience 
of visitors.”65 The Fair Grounds track grew so popular that by 1904 the Street Railway Company 
carried as many as 10,000 visitors daily there, building “provisional tracks and runs of cars 
straight to the gates to induce people to go there.”66 The installation of electric lights in 1881 for 
night races and normalization of Sunday racing “for those who cannot attend during the work 
week” were some of the commercial efforts that showed the changing nature of the horse race.67 
The greatest transformation, though, both to the turf in general and New Orleans 
specifically, was the proposal by Northern racing promoter, W.A. Engeman, that instead of a 
single spring meet, the club should focus on a long winter racing season when the cold weather 
had closed the prominent tracks of the North. The resulting adoption of the regular winter racing 
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meet, beginning on January 27, 1883, led to the change in the character of Southern racing, 
signifying not just the continuation of national integration of the city’s tracks but, more 
importantly, the distinctive niche that differentiated the race tracks of New Orleans from the 
other major tracks in the United States. The classic Southern racing style of competitions of 
endurance gave way entirely to Northern racing ideals characterized by a single sprint 
concentrating only on speed. Historian Gunther Barth argues that industrialization and 
specialization also supported the shift to speed over heat races, as “watching heats came to bore 
people chafing at the monotony of daily routines.”68 Jockey Clubs of the city appealed to the 
national turf scene, hoping to attract more prominent stables through the adoption of the 
Northern standard of racing. The general adoption of Sunday racing, acceptable in New Orleans, 
but not the Puritanical northern states, because of the city’s Catholic heritage, also distinguished 
the city among the national tracks. Institutionalizing Sunday races allowed numerous laborers to 
participate in the world of the turf. It was one more manner in which horse racing attempted to 
democratize, moving from an elite pastime to a mass leisure activity. 
The adoption of Sunday races and the winter racing season solved the first problem of 
how to differentiate the New Orleans tracks from the other tracks of the United States. The 
further implementation of the national standard of rules was expected to attract the leading 
northern stables and bolster the prominence of the New Orleans tracks. But the Fair Grounds 
“could not consistently attract the country’s leading thoroughbreds, because many owners 
preferred to rest their animals during the winter.”69 Hoping that increased purse sizes would 
entice those stables to race in the city, the New Louisiana Jockey Club leased out the Fair 
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Grounds to a group of professional gambling pool sellers during the 1885 winter season, taking a 
large cut from their profits to fund the prizes. Attendance began to flag during that season, but 
Leon Lamothe and Ira E. Bride, the two most important of the professional gamblers, were able 
to enhance the gambling profits to offset the loss of admission fees. The amount of money that 
gambling raised led to an announcement that on certain race days “in keeping with Mr. 
Lamothe’s liberal spirit… every person will be admitted free of charge.”70  
The professional gamblers also brought with them a new more scientific and democratic 
form of betting – the pari-mutuel system. The pari-mutuel, also known as the “French Mutual 
system” or the “Paris Mutual system,” was part of a gambling shift toward scientific rationality, 
relying on a machine that quickly calculated and displayed the bets on a tote board, or totalizer. 
Pari-mutuel differed from fixed-odds gambling because in fixed-odds gambling, the individual 
bets against the odds given by the bookmaker or other individual. The odds given at the time of 
the bet are unchanging; therefore the bettor immediately knows how much he stands to win 
should his bet pay out. In order to ensure a profit, the bookmaker often marks up the book, so 
that the sum of all possible probabilities is greater than 100 percent. The odds will vary greatly 
between bookmakers as they are reliant on their research and beliefs, not the “true” odds, as 
shown by public betting. The pari-mutuel system tries to determine the true odds for the horses, 
thus the odds and payout constantly fluctuate based on the number of bets up until post time, 
with the machine’s calculating live betting and changing the displayed odds. All the money 
wagered on one race goes into a pot. After a small amount is taken out for state taxes, and some 
more for the racing association, the rest of the money wagered on the losing horses is then 
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distributed to the winning bettors, including repayment of their original bets.
71
 The main 
difference between fixed-odds betting and pari-mutuel betting is the determination of odds and 
payout. Pari-mutuel gambling takes into account the public bets so that the gambler is in effect 
betting against the other gamblers, while in fixed-odds gambling, the gambler is betting against 
the house and the bookmaker. The pari-mutuel system can be seen as a more democratic one, as 
it removed the possibly crooked bookmaker from the scenario, who sets betting lines in search of 
his own profit, and allows the people to wager among themselves, with the track and/or state 
charging a small percentage commission for the facilitation of bets. With more money, the 
Jockey Clubs raised the purse amounts, enticing a better breed of horse. New gambling houses 
sprang up around the city, catering to upscale elites and high-stakes gamblers, as well as the two-
bit bettors and bookies.  
Lamothe’s impact was short-lived, though. Once the New Louisiana Jockey Club realized 
the sheer amount of money that Lamothe personally earned after the club took a cut and Lamothe 
distributed the rest of the profits among the other pool sellers, the club ended his lease early and 
regained full control of the track, including pool selling. The professional nature of Lamothe’s 
gambling enterprise was integral to the success of the track, however. Once the professional 
gamblers left, the club depleted its funds with four straight seasons in the red. Dissatisfied with 
their investment, the New Louisiana Jockey Club permanently ceded control of the track to the 
professional gamblers and promoters, now organized under the Crescent City Jockey Club. 
Lamothe and other “enterprising local sporting men” organized the Crescent City Jockey Club in 
December 1892, which differed from the others in that it was comprised of mostly professional 
horsemen and gamblers, a far cry from the old elite of the city. Bookmaking became the primary 
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form of gambling when the Crescent City Jockey Club gave bookmakers the monopoly on 
betting and also gave Western Union the exclusive right to transmit race results to other cities, 
concurrently protecting their own gate receipts by ensuring that Western Union would not 
transmit the race results to local poolrooms.
72
 Gambling was no longer a private matter between 
people like in the antebellum days, but was now wholly sanctioned by the tracks and 
institutionalized in the sport. The mimicry of those antebellum turfmen by the gamblers though 
“posed a problem of class reproduction” as “wealthy gamblers, like political bosses, supplanted 
the upper class.”73 
 The formation of the Crescent City Jockey Club and the policies of that club represented 
the final stage in the process and evolution in New Orleans racing from Adelman’s premodern 
sporting ideal to the modern sporting ideal.
74
 The general “search for order” on the race track had 
its foundations in tactics of crowd control. With the increased fixed costs of new facilities and 
technology, the clubs could little afford the property damage caused by an unruly audience. 
Segregation, not just by race and class, but also in excluding the disreputable turfman, was one 
method of minimizing tension at the track. Licensing structures were necessary to enforce the 
exclusion. Besides using licensing to keep out corrupt gamblers and turfmen, the clubs used 
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licensing to enforce a strict standard of honesty among the starters, judges, and bookmakers.
75
 
Any licensing measures, though, require a superior organizing body to enforce the rules 
nationally. As such, the Crescent City Jockey Club standardized its rules to conform to that of 
the Jockey Club, formed in 1894 in New York as the national governing body. The powers 
claimed by the Jockey Club included registering every thoroughbred in racing, creating and 
revising racing rules, establishing racing dates at the tracks, appointing racing officials, licensing 
trainers and jockeys, and protecting the “honor” of the sport.76 The Jockey Club solidified their 
power by purchasing the original volumes of the American Stud Book, establishing complete 
control of the Thoroughbred registry. By defining a thoroughbred as a horse that can trace its 
lineage back eight consecutive thoroughbred generations as recorded in the stud book, the Jockey 
Club ensured that it would be the sole authority, bringing control and order to the sport.
77
 With 
solidified national, regional, and local structures in the sport, as well as a uniform standard of 
rules, horse racing finalized its processes of modernization. 
The shifting nature of the jockey clubs from the antebellum years through the Gilded Age 
reflects the changes in Southern society. Historian Edward Ayers notes “the men who steered the 
South into ‘progress’ tended to have little use for old-fashioned honor.”78 As the professional 
horsemen and gamblers ingrained themselves in the later jockey clubs, supplanting the planter 
aristocracy and removing the concept of honor from the sport, lamentations became prevalent 
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throughout the late-nineteenth century about the “decline” of the Southern turf. An editorial in 
the Macon Telegraph mourned that “the famous Metairie is now a graveyard; the great racing 
events are all crowded in the East and West.”79 This was not a criticism of the actual practical 
decline, as the tracks remained generally profitable. Even during the lean years when the tracks 
lost money, the races still served an economic function for the city. The Times-Picayune noted in 
1866, for example, that “every branch of trade is helped by the attractions of a well conducted 
race course.”80 But Southerners decried the insidious influence of money as corrupting the honor 
associated with the proud antebellum “sport of kings.”81 Georgia’s Governor John B. Gordon 
believed that the New South might prosper if only it retained “the best of the old values, 
particularly honesty in politics and a sense of moral worth above ‘mere wealth’.”82 The changing 
nature of the sportsman from the amateur planter elite to the professional horseman and gambler 
demonstrates the realization of the fears of many in the New South. 
The change in class dynamic among the clubs brought about not only this fear of 
corruption, but an increase in scandal also. As the jockey clubs shifted control of the sport from 
the old aristocracy to the gamblers and promoters, racing began to lose some of its integrity. The 
concept of conspicuous consumption, described by Thorstein Veblen, made it difficult to 
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distinguish between the wealthy capitalists and sharpers who came together in these clubs.
83
 The 
increased stakes of the culture of chance led to numerous gamblers and bookmakers trying to 
influence their odds through underhanded tactics. The New Orleans turf was no longer that of 
Duncan Kenner who ensured that races were run “under the strictest rules, and the youngest 
negro rider… would have scorned to take unfair advantage in riding a race.”84 In the 1880s, the 
New Orleans Times argued that “it is… all important that the control of the New Orleans turf be 
kept, as it is now, in the hands of gentlemen who will tolerate nothing bearing the shadow of 
resemblance to trickery.”85 It was not uncommon at the time for jockeys to own horses as well as 
ride them. In addition, some of the bookmakers also owned large stables of horses which they 
also raced. In one case, when a jockey had lost on a heavily favored horse which he owned, he 
had to furnish proof that he actually tried his hardest to win. He successfully defended his effort 
by citing a $1,000 bet on his own horse.
86
 The hiring of New Orleans stable owner Frank James, 
brother of Jesse, as the betting commissioner in the 1900s did little to change public opinion over 
the fixed nature of horse racing. By the mid-1900s, the New Orleans public was dissatisfied with 
the continual club promises to clean up the sport. Public “hostility toward the unreality of 
speculative wealth and suspicion of the speculator’s (or gambler’s) ‘castles in the air,’” 
developed into a corrective to the culture of chance – a corrective identified by historian Jackson 
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Lears as the “culture of control.”87 This corrective arose from a desire for real reform and 
prompted the intrusion of moral reformers and the Louisiana state government to determine 
control of the future of New Orleans racing. 
Although economic historians John Legler and Richard Sylla conclude that New Orleans 
was “not well integrated” with national markets in the period from the end of the Civil War to 
the turn of the twentieth-century, this analysis is unsubstantiated when it comes to the national 
market of sports.
88
 The attempts by the planter aristocracy to restore the standing of the New 
Orleans tracks allowed the new class of professional sportsmen to gain status. They brought in 
outside capital and improved the New Orleans tracks by acceding to national standards. As more 
money began flowing into the tracks, the lucrativeness enticed many more professional 
sportsmen and gamblers to New Orleans. Their democratic ideals about horse racing differed 
vastly from the antebellum character of the sport as an extension of elite Southern honor. But it 
was these democratizing influences that brought in more spectators and profits. One columnist 
for the Times-Picayune lamented the distant past, saying that “in those days horse-racing was 
really ‘the sport of kings’, and not a means of acquiring money.”89 The professionalization of the 
horse racing in New Orleans as it evolved from 1865 to the 1900s reveals the New Southern 
character and shows how New Orleans was able to integrate into the growing nation by carving 
out its own unique niche. The jockey clubs of the planter elite had backed the wrong horse, and 
lost their influence on the track to the new class of professional turfmen. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
A BETTER BREED OF MEN: 
MORAL REFORMERS, STATE POLITICS, AND THE DEBATE OVER THE 
CONTROL OF HORSE RACING IN LOUISIANA 
 
The growing significance of thoroughbred horse racing to all levels of American society 
turned the sport into a political game. With the chance to gain power, social status, and money, 
conflicts arose over who would create the rules, who would get the gold, and who would take the 
glory. Seizing upon perceived instances of fraud and manipulation, the expanding moral reform 
forces, decrying the professional gamblers, urban depravity, and the “mammonism and 
worldliness” that corrupted both the state and its youth, turned the turf into a battleground.1 
Louisiana Lieutenant Governor Jared Y. Sanders articulated these concerns in 1907, saying 
“there can be no doubt that racing as presently carried on in this community is demoralizing in 
its tendencies, subversive of good morals and especially dangerous in its effects upon the youth 
of the city and State,” but added the caveat that “under proper control and regulations… racing 
may continue to be one of the attractions of New Orleans.”2 Two powerful external influences – 
Protestant moral reformers and the Louisiana state government – as well as the internal influence 
of the Jockey Club sought to gain that control and determine the destiny of the New Orleans turf. 
As was the case with the vices of prostitution and liquor, reform was practically guaranteed, but 
the nature of reform remained in doubt as the forces of regulation matched up against the forces 
of prohibition. 
 The commercialized nature of horse racing as it flourished in the late-nineteenth century 
created interdependence between the tracks and bookmakers. The unbridled growth in the 
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number of race tracks fostered competition between them, leading to increased purse sizes to 
attract more competitors. The tracks then relied partially on admissions fees, but mostly 
bookmakers, to provide the money to afford these purses. The bookmakers also relied on the 
tracks to attract high quality competition which would then attract the gambling public. The 
success of the tracks also relied on the active roles taken by civic leaders, politicians, and the 
New Orleans machine in promoting professional sport. With some of these civic leaders at the 
helm of the sport, race track gambling kicked back a certain amount of money to its 
governmental benefactors and sponsors. Many of the gaming dens and professional gambling 
areas were not licensed, but were “permitted to exist by paying a bonus to the Democratic city 
administration, which goes to some charitable(?) fund.”3 Their system was not as well-organized 
as the Louisiana Lottery Company, but the public perception of governmental complicity in 
allowing unregulated gambling still eroded trust in the government to ever curb such a scheme. 
No longer was the New Orleans political culture “linked to its farmers as the embodiment of 
public virtues” as it had been in the days when a planter aristocracy ruled.4 The corruption at the 
heart of New Orleans politics is exemplified through the supervision of gaming in the decades 
after the Civil War. 
Journalist Herbert Asbury described the control of gaming in New Orleans as “toleration 
under corrupt administrations, and suppression when reform elements were in power.”5 The 
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gambling situation in nineteenth century New Orleans was untenable. After the legalization of 
gambling in 1869, St. Charles Avenue alone, between City Hall and Canal Street, boasted forty 
gaming houses open, often running night and day, seven days a week.
6
 Too much competition 
was not ideal for the larger houses, and many gambling dens used dishonest tactics to bolster 
their profit margin. This dishonesty and corruption would lead to regulation. The election of 
Mayor Joseph Shakespeare in 1880 brought the promise of reform. In 1881, Shakespeare ordered 
the closure of all but sixteen gambling houses and organized a system wherein each operator 
could stay open without heavy competition or paying police blackmail. To remain open, the 
houses were required to run honest games, keep minors from playing, and contribute $150 per 
month into a private fund.
7
 This system – called the Shakespeare Plan – lasted for nearly six 
years, raising $30,000 annually to support the Shakespeare Almshouse in the city. After 
Shakespeare was voted out in favor of J. Valsin Guillotte in 1885, Guillotte diverted those 
contributions to a contingency fund for city officials. The system failed when the gambling 
houses refused to continue making contributions to what was now the city slush fund. The cycle 
of toleration and suppression lasted into the twentieth century, with preferential treatment going 
to those who paid to play. The palm-greasing that united politics and gaming was repugnant to 
many reformers who believed that the “Democratic rule in this city is a bane to the community.”8 
This history of “reform” was one reason why moral reformers like Rev. Beverly Warner 
preached that “a decent administration of government is impossible without decent men in office 
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and a decent electorate to whom they feel themselves to be answerable.”9 It was argued that state 
action was necessary for change since the city and the New Orleans political machine could not 
be relied upon to police itself. 
The complete surrender to the culture of chance in New Orleans, as evidenced by the 
New Louisiana Jockey Club’s dependence on Leon Lamothe’s gambling pool for profit, aroused 
the ire of moral redeemers who feared that “society had surrendered to amoral chance.”10 
Religious leaders across the state, led by New Orleans Catholic Archbishop James Hubert Blenk 
and Episcopalian Rev. Beverly Warner, took up the fight against “the iniquitous ‘pony pollution’ 
within [Louisiana.]”11 Uniting a coalition across the religious spectrum, with New Orleans 
religious authorities such as Rabbi Max Heller, Presbyterian minister John Christie Barr, and 
Methodist pastor S.H. Werlein, it was reported that “the religious sentiment of the State is a unit 
against the proposition” for race-track gambling.12 Archbishop Blenk’s call for Catholics of his 
diocese to stop “this contemplated crime against our children, our homes, and everything else 
worth living and striving for” was seen as a “surprise in the ranks of this great religious body [i.e. 
the Catholic Church], which has heretofore remained conservative in this matter.”13 The religious 
leaders’ arguments hinged on the belief that racing and gambling created disorder in moral and 
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social life. Blenk felt it “was a Catholic’s duty to compel morality as a citizen, and to use his 
political activities for that purpose.”14 The religious reformers contended that without the 
imposition of strict moral reform, any proposed regulation could not endure.
15
 
Ministerial opposition to horse racing was the outgrowth of the culture of control and 
derived chiefly from horse racing’s connection to and reliance on gambling culture. Some 
religious reformers, though, took the notion of gambling even further, decrying the entire culture 
of chance. Social Gospel advocate Rev. Washington Gladden voiced his concerns over the 
contradictory Christian approach to amusement. In an 1873 editorial on “Protestant 
Monasticism,” he condemned the flawed logic in a church kicking out a man for simply playing 
cards while simultaneously honoring “the hoary stock-gambler who has wrung millions of 
dollars from his fellow-men by knavish overreaching.”16 Bishop Henry C. Vrooman linked 
gambling to Gilded Age growth of speculation and business, saying that “of all the varied types 
of gambling doubtless the most colossal is that of the great stock exchanges, and the success of 
every rich man’s corner is apt to be followed by the dishonesty or suicide, or both, of some of his 
victims.”17 Evangelical writer John Bigelow also spoke to the religious aspect, but in stark 
contrast to the other opinions, he called upon the state legislature to fix the issues, in the name of 
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preserving liberty. He cited the Louisiana lottery as a case where the state had “become so 
completely entangled in the meshes of lottery gamblers that the Federal government was obliged 
to interpose with its strong arm to restore to the crippled State its imperiled sovereignty.”18 
Senator Bulow Ward Marston took these concerns to heart and drafted an anti-futures bill to 
“release the toiling farmers of Louisiana and of the South from the thralldom of what he termed 
the cotton gambler.”19 Arguing vehemently that “enough talk had been indulged in regarding the 
horse race to move a mountain,” he believed “the race track evil did not near reach this question 
in importance.”20 Despite his candor, and that of the other advocates who demonstrated that they 
held a deep understanding of the contradictions inherent in society, their efforts to expand the 
fight against gambling to the economic arena were unable to gain much traction in politics or the 
press. The focus remained chiefly on the race tracks and the vice of gambling that accompanied 
the sport. 
The New Orleans race tracks not only had to fight against the forces of religion, but also 
a press that branded them as “outlaws.” The issue of outlaw tracks was advanced by the news 
media, after disputes over licensing authority emerged among the national jockey clubs: the 
American Turf Congress, the Western Jockey Club and the Jockey Club. These intra-turf fights 
entangled many local jockey clubs in the upper echelon’s political fracas. The struggle began 
after the organization of the Western Jockey Club in 1901. Citing the lax authority of the 
American Turf Congress, the Western Jockey Club took drastic measures against unlicensed 
tracks, claiming that any jockey, owner, or official who takes any role in these unlicensed races 
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would be disqualified from any official meeting of the Western Jockey Club.
21
 The first earnest 
attack on the ruling came in Little Rock where the local track attempted to organize their meet 
under the auspices of the American Turf Congress, refusing to acknowledge the jurisdiction of 
the Western Jockey Club. Multiple stable owners who were part of the Western Jockey Club 
signed an agreement to race at tracks not sanctioned by the club, most notably, the Little Rock 
track, leading the club to brand them as “outlaws.”22 The Memphis Jockey Club announced they 
would stand firm with the Western Jockey Club, disallowing the outlaw turfmen from racing at 
their track. But Secretary Sheridan Clark of the Crescent City Jockey Club announced to the turf 
press that the Crescent City Jockey Club would not uphold the “outlaw ruling” of the Western 
Jockey Club. Clark declared that any turfman banned by the ruling would be reinstated by his 
club upon application.
23
 Clark’s actions here were notably that of a smaller organization trying to 
reclaim power lost to a national body. But it was also part of the larger public narrative on the 
declining morality of the turf bodies, associating the New Orleans tracks with the ideas of 
“outlaws” and not submitting to authority.  
The constant calls for governmental reform and action prompted the Louisiana state 
government to investigate the issues surrounding horse racing in New Orleans and around the 
state. New Orleans had long held the power throughout the state, but the Progressive Era shift 
against the New Orleans machine reasserted the power of the state government to reign in the 
excesses of the Big Easy. The legislative bills of the early 1900s supported by the racing interests 
were ones that had the goal of stamping out perceived corruption in gambling, while reaffirming 
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the well-regulated order of the New Orleans jockey clubs. The basis for this reform can be seen 
in the changes instituted by the Jockey Club in the 1890s. The Jockey Club, under the 
chairmanship of August Belmont, Jr., supported the Percy-Gray bill in New York – a bill 
intending to outlaw gambling on races. Belmont’s influence in the state assembly amended the 
bill to “authorize a specified amount of racing by limiting the sport to the ‘better’ tracks,” thus 
bringing New York racing entirely within the purview of the Jockey Club.
24
 In return, the Jockey 
Club would pay what we know as a sin tax, giving back thousands of dollars annually to the state 
treasury, a tactic that also served to “[remind] state legislators of the economic value of the sport 
to the state.”25 It was hoped that the Percy-Gray law would reestablish elite control of the sport 
by removing the undesirable track elements and prohibiting poolroom and turf exchange 
gambling. Louisiana politicians followed New York’s lead and sought to shutter the poolrooms 
in order to appease the reformers and induce greater track attendance. 
The vice of the poolroom had exploded in popularity as telegraph technology improved. 
These large betting rooms, or “turf exchanges,” were “often equipped with receiving sets to keep 
customers and bettors posted on baseball scores and track results.”26 The instantaneous reporting 
of horse races through the telegraph wire meant that book makers no longer were required to pay 
the track for the privilege of laying odds in the betting ring. Bookies could divert patrons away 
from the race track gates, tempting them with other diversions such as women, alcohol, and other 
forms of gambling. By calling these gambling rooms “turf exchanges,” it bestowed upon them a 
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professional nature, linking them with organizations like the Sugar Exchange or Cotton 
Exchange – that is, speculation, not gambling. Dishonest poolroom operators devastated the 
image of poolrooms through various confidence games. Because the operator controlled the 
dissemination of information, “if bettors were backing a favorite heavily, the poolroom operator 
could keep on accepting bets long after he learned that the horse had lost, and give out the bad 
news in his own good time.”27 The Crescent City Jockey Club attempted to combat this fraud – 
locally, at least – through an arrangement with Western Union. The deal struck in the 1890s 
“granted track bookmakers a betting monopoly and gave Western Union the exclusive right to 
dispatch results to gamblers and pool-sellers in other cities,” provided they agreed not to deliver 
results to local poolrooms.
28
 This arrangement did not last, however, so the jockey clubs decided 
that a regulatory, legislative solution was necessary to solve the persistent nuisance of the 
poolroom. 
In 1902, State Representative Ernest J. Reinhardt of New Orleans submitted House Bill 
No. 13 that aimed to suppress the poolrooms throughout the state and also limit the time for 
horse racing. Despite the bill, the legislative reporter for the Times-Picayune believed “there is 
no probability of any serious steps being taken to abolish or curtail the time of the winter 
meeting.”29 The representatives of the poolroom interests opposed Reinhardt’s actions and were 
instead “anxious to see a license tax imposed.”30 The poolroom owners thought the situation 
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unfair, noting that the race tracks had not yet been under licensing guidelines, and the property 
tax paid by the track was the only revenue received by the state and city from them.
31
 After the 
failure of Reinhardt’s bill in the House Judiciary Committee, Representative Henry D. Wilson of 
Tangipahoa introduced two revenue license bills, proposing a graduated license tax on all race 
tracks and pool rooms in the state.
32
 Hoping that the municipal funding they provided would 
reflect favorably on them as reliable business organizations, the poolroom and race track 
interests did not oppose the bills. The pool room bill was tabled after it made it to the Senate, but 
the race track license passed through the Senate and was signed into law by the governor on July 
10, 1902, becoming Act No. 223 of 1902. As with Percy-Gray in New York, Louisiana racing 
interests believed that these steps to bring order through licensure would appease the growing 
calls for reform. And just like the New York racing men, New Orleans turfmen had 
underestimated the strength of the undercurrent of support held by urban reformers. 
These early legislative attempts tried to solve some of the issues surrounding race track 
gambling by focusing on where gambling was occurring. In many ways, this style of regulation 
was similar to the sanction and growth of Storyville, the New Orleans red-light district that 
existed from 1897 until 1917. A city with an unofficial motto of “Laissez les Bon Temps Rouler” 
was certainly not one to ban every vice. Many New Orleans citizens pushed for regulation rather 
than prohibition. Like the national attraction of the city’s race tracks, Storyville was also a 
component of the socio-economic policies to modernize New Orleans and reintegrate it into 
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commercial American society after Reconstruction. The growth of the concert saloon near the 
turn of the century blurred the line between brothel and bar. Without laws defining and 
regulating these types of businesses, young girls were regularly found working in these houses.
33
 
The Daily Picayune called for an end to concert saloons, but did not want to target houses of 
prostitution, provided they were clearly marked as such, since “it was no use going after sin 
itself.”34 The New Orleans Mascot also declared that it had no issue with “houses of ill fame…as 
long as they are not located in respectable neighborhoods.”35 Thus, the Storyville ordinance was 
established, which did not explicitly legalize prostitution within certain city limits, but 
criminalized it without those limits. While it was meant to contain the vice of prostitution by 
focusing on where it could occur, Storyville’s existence only confirmed the argument that New 
Orleans was a city of sin. The worlds of horse racing and prostitution were linked through the 
Blue Books of Storyville, said to be issued for the benefit of men “who want to be a 
thoroughbred rounder” and featuring ads like the one for the Arlington Café and Restaurant, 
picturing a thoroughbred race horse and the caption “The House of Sports.”36 Such houses 
catered to the upscale elites and high-stakes gamblers, as well as two-bit bettors and bookies. 
The Blue Books often advertised to “sporting” men, defined by historian Emily Epstein Landau 
as code for “the male world of drinking, gambling, and prostitution.”37 Archbishop Blenk also 
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related the failures of regulation in the vices of race track gambling and prostitution, asserting 
that “clean racing is as imposible[sic] as a clean brothel.”38 If reformers believed the race-track 
was a site of immorality, they were even harsher on the depravity that took place in the rest of 
the sporting world. 
The legislature finally took action against poolrooms through Act No. 128 of 1904, better 
known as the Hunsicker Poolroom bill. Introduced by Representative Henry Hunsicker of Caddo 
Parish, the bill declared the operation of poolrooms to be gambling, and therefore it should be 
suppressed.
39
 After several poolroom closures and arrests, the issue came before the Louisiana 
Supreme Court in the case of State v. Rabb. After his arrest and imprisonment, defendant 
William Rabb appealed the original decision, arguing that the crime he was accused of was not 
defined in the law. Chief Justice Joseph A. Breaux’s opinion held that “gaming in poolrooms is 
prohibited by statute in terms not to be misunderstood,” since the wording of the statute 
“unmistakably denounces as illicit an act of betting in poolrooms.”40 The Chief Justice explained 
the intent of the law which was focused on where the gambling occurred. He said it did not 
prohibit legitimate betting on horse races at the track, but prohibited it at the poolroom where 
“the racing of horses was the merest incident and gambling was the attraction (in a retired place 
away from the race track).”41 A similar ruling in State v. Maloney had Justice Alfred D. Land 
opine that the Hunsicker Poolroom Law “was in response to [previous] decisions of this court to 
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the effect that betting on horse races, whether on the track or remote from the track, was 
sanctioned by the Civil Code of the State. The act is, therefore, to be construed with reference to 
the particular evil pointed out and sought to be remedied.” 42 The rulings on the Hunsicker cases 
set a strong precedent that would be used in later gambling cases, as Chief Justice Breaux made 
clear that “it is incumbent upon [the Court] to interpret statutes as written.”43 These Supreme 
Court cases impressed upon the state legislature the importance of wording in any potential anti-
gambling statute. 
Legislation supported by the jockey clubs rhetorically declared that the clubs were 
invested in cleaning the dishonest element out of the sport. But more important, it consolidated 
control of the tracks and gambling in the hands of the jockey clubs, turfmen, and professional 
gamblers. Regulation was the route that legislators wanted to take to curb vice, but many 
reformers saw this as not just a centralization of immorality, but a corrupting influence on 
government too. Urban reformers who opposed the rule of the New Orleans Mayor Martin 
Behrman, the Choctaw Club, and machine politics, grew dismayed over the close connections 
between the New Orleans machine and gambling interests. They viewed the consolidation of turf 
control as increasing machine power in the state. Mounting agitation among reformers, turfmen, 
and the public had been increasing the pressure on the legislature to act on the track question. 
The biggest impetus on the legislature to respond, however, was the January 1908 election of 
Governor Jared Y. Sanders, Sr. Announcing in his inaugural address that “the manner and mode 
of conducting race tracks in and around New Orleans, and the flagrant gambling carried on at the 
tracks, has deservedly aroused the moral sense of the people against it,” Sanders pushed the 
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General Assembly to enact “legislation prohibiting and penalizing gambling on horse racing.”44 
Less than a month later, two competing plans for state action faced off in the legislature: one 
based on internal reform and regulation, the other on external reform and prohibition. 
The first bill regarding race track gambling to reach the floor was the one introduced by 
State Representative Leon Locke of Lake Charles. The language of the bill proposed by 
Representative Locke was drafted with the help of the Anti-Race Track Committee of New 
Orleans, chaired by James Joseph McLoughlin, a New Orleans lawyer who was involved with 
numerous Catholic interests.
45
 Other key committee members included attorney Chandler 
Luzenberg, Archbishop Blenk, financier Robert M. Walmsley, Rabbi Isaac L. Leucht, and 
reformer John M. Parker.
46
 Within days of Governor Sanders’ inauguration, the Anti-Race Track 
Committee met with the governor to draw up legislation and then spoke with many senators and 
representatives to drum up support. The full-text of the final bill put forward by Locke was quite 
short:  
An Act to prohibit gambling on horse races by the operation of betting 
books, French Mutuel pooling devices, auction pools or other device, and to 
provide penalties for the violation of the provisions thereof. 
 
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana, that any person 
who, either as agent, owner, officer or employee, shall in any room, hall, house, 
or any inclosure, or upon any track, path, road or course, whether within or 
without an inclosure, in this State, engage in encouraging, promoting, aiding or 
assisting in the operation of a betting book, or a French Mutuel pooling device, 
upon any kind of horse race or races, or in selling auction pools upon any horse 
race, which are hereby declared to be gambling, or shall by any other device 
encourage, promote, aid or assist any person or persons to bet or wage upon a 
horse race or races, run or trotted or paced, within this State or elsewhere, shall be 
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guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be fined not less than one 
hundred dollars and imprisoned for a period of not less than six nor more than 
twelve months.
47
 
Believing all race track gambling “to be a menace to our homes and the prolific cause of 
embezzlement and crime,” the Anti-Race Track Committee and Senator Locke pointed to the 
fraud, corruption, and disreputable characters as their rationale for banning race track 
gambling.
48
 
The Locke bill prohibited all bookmaking and pari-mutuel gambling at Louisiana race 
tracks, effectively shutting down the New Orleans race tracks. This reform was meant to emulate 
the Hart-Agnew Law that had recently been passed by the New York legislature with the backing 
of New York Governor Charles Evans Hughes, which prohibited race track gambling in the 
previously untouchable New York racing stronghold. The Hart-Agnew Law forced the two-year 
closure of the Saratoga Race Track, one of the oldest and most prestigious in the nation.
49
 Like 
New Orleans, Sarasota Springs catered to the elite with its fair share of casinos, hotels, and 
houses of prostitution. Senator Locke and the Anti-Race Track Committee desired to repeat New 
York’s legislative success. 
In an effort to stave off disaster and bring order to the Louisiana tracks, State Senator 
Charles C. Cordill of Tensas Parish introduced a bill proposing a state commission to regulate 
and reform horse racing and gambling. The Cordill bill would control and segregate the 
unrestricted bookmaking interests, allowing only licensed professional gamblers to operate at the 
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New Orleans tracks and shutting down the smaller tracks that were thought to be the cause of the 
corruption. Leading the fight in support of the Cordill bill was a former Representative from 
Orleans, Major George H. Terriberry, now representing the interests of the City Park and 
Crescent City Jockey Clubs. The jockey clubs stated publicly that they would be “perfectly 
satisfied with a most drastic [racing] commission” or anything that would preserve the sport.50 In 
Major Terriberry’s statement for both clubs, he announced that they wanted to preserve 
legitimate racing through regulation in order to ensure that it remained a “high-class sport.” 
These regulations included:  
no Sunday races, no night races; no half-mile tracks within twenty-five miles of 
cities of over 50,000 inhabitants; no owner of a race horse participating in racing 
can be a stockbroker in the Club that is directing the meeting; no owner shall be a 
bookmaker or have any interests in a book; no minors shall be admitted to the 
track unless accompanied by their parents or legitimate guardians; no racing 
association would be permitted to carry on racing without having the permit of the 
State Commission; the Commission shall be the judge of how many days shall be 
allotted to any Club and no ground for a race track could be broken without the 
permit and sanction of the State Commission.
51
 
Despite the call for regulation, the jockey clubs still hoped to preserve their influence on the 
sport. Metropolitan New Orleans had two main race tracks: City Park and the New Orleans Fair 
Grounds, managed by the City Park Jockey Club and Crescent City Jockey Club, respectively. 
They faced some minor competition from a few smaller half-mile tracks, not sanctioned by any 
of the local or national Jockey Clubs, which were believed to attract the more disreputable 
bookmakers and horsemen. These tracks could be found in Jefferson Parish and in St. Bernard 
Parish, both just outside New Orleans. Jefferson Parish has had a long tradition of open, illegal 
gambling, tacitly tolerated by the sheriff, the local law enforcement official in the early 1900s. 
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Gambling thrived in Jefferson Parish under Sheriff Louis (Leo) H. Marrero in what was often 
called the “Free State of Jefferson.”52 As New Orleans was the only city in Louisiana with over 
50,000 people at that time, the proposed bill meant that City Park and the New Orleans Fair 
Grounds tracks would be the only ones allowed to run.
53
 With no other tracks in the city longer 
than a half-mile, and with a permit and sanction required to even break ground, both jockey clubs 
would have even more control over New Orleans racing. The debate over which competing 
vision of the sport would prevail grew extremely heated during the summer of 1908. 
 The supporters of racing focused on two main rhetorical strategies in their defense of 
racing. First, they defended the sport as promoting the development of thoroughbred horses. 
Representative William T. Cunningham of Natchitoches argued that “to do away with the races 
meant the doing away with the fine horse.”54 He echoed Matt Winn’s sentiment regarding betting 
in that “there are a lot of good people raising horses, and when you deny them the privilege of 
backing their judgment you deny them a means of making a living.”55 Second, the supporters 
emphasized the economic aspect and the tourism it brought to New Orleans. John J. Frawley of 
the City Council spoke before the House of Representatives about the “good that the game does 
for the city.”56 A petition from a group of hotel men against the bill reasoned that “they had 
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invested millions in property” and that “their principal patronage in winter was from the racing 
people,” without whom some $500,000 would be taken out of circulation during the winter 
season.
57
 One of those men was Justin F. Denechaud of the New Denechaud Hotel, which hosted 
three thousand people during the racing season, twenty five percent of whom were attracted by 
the race track. He said that he personally was not interested in the tracks, but racing was “the 
strongest card New Orleans had for winter tourists. If the races are abolished I believe the hotel 
business as now developed would be a losing proposition.”58 The turfmen’s solution was one of 
centralized management in the state racing commission to ensure honesty in the sport. 
Representative Charles A. Byrne of New Orleans spoke for them against the Locke bill, 
concluding “if racing in New Orleans is an evil, it is because it is mismanaged.”59 
The Louisiana legislators in favor of banning race-track gambling needed to look no 
further than the Louisiana Constitution to find a strategy to attack racing. Article XIX, Section 8 
of the Constitution declared that “gambling is a vice and the Legislature shall pass laws to 
suppress it.”60 The gambling opponents could not fathom any attempt at regulation as they 
considered it a constitutional obligation to suppress gambling. Representative Locke argued that 
prohibition was necessary as there was no such thing as a “‘golden medium’ between right and 
wrong.”61 The other pro-racing arguments were attacked from a moral standpoint. The horse 
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breeding argument came under fire from New Orleans Representative Harold A. Moise who was 
“opposed to any method to elevate the breed of horses that degrades the breed of men.”62 The 
economic argument was assailed as well. Attorney Chandler Luzenberg argued that it should not 
just be about the money, “but the business integrity of the men…. The money these race-track 
followers spend is not brought to New Orleans; it is taken away from our own people, many of 
whom cannot afford it and some of whom have stolen it.”63 The arguments for the superiority of 
the moral economy generally referenced an earlier reform in Louisiana politics – the prohibition 
of the Louisiana Lottery. 
 The tactics and integrity of Lottery commissioner Charles T. Howard were discussed in 
the previous chapter; the corruption of the system and the religious opposition to the scheme are 
the important factors here. The Louisiana Lottery Company was the most successful of the 
lottery companies established after the Civil War. Howard’s deal-making ability, and political 
bribery, ensured that the Louisiana Lottery had all the resources and protection it needed, while 
kicking back a sizeable amount of taxes to the state. Known as “the Serpent” by its critics, a vast 
network allowed the Louisiana Lottery to be marketed nationally through the mail, telegraph, 
and branch offices. Over ninety percent of the lottery tickets for the Louisiana lottery were sold 
outside of Louisiana.
64
 Not only were other states disturbed by how much money was moving 
from their state into Louisiana, but the Louisiana Anti-Lottery League was also concerned with 
the corrupting influence of the Lottery on the state. In 1890, Congress passed a law banning 
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lottery-related mail from being delivered and its enforcement led to the shuttering of the 
Lottery’s Louisiana operations in early 1892. The callback to the Lottery fight during the anti-
gambling debates of 1908 drew on one clear similarity – though it was “never simply a moral 
crusade, the Louisiana antilottery movement clearly had a religious dimension, and ministers 
actively participated.”65 
 With spirited debate already in progress in the House of Representatives, the anti-race 
track faction quickly had a bill introduced in the State Senate by Senator J. Rush Wimberly of 
Bienville, similar to the Locke Bill, hoping to “start the fires in the Senate, as well as in the 
House.”66 By June, the racetrack issue overshadowed everything else in the Legislature. Both 
sides had persuasive, fiery speakers who lambasted each other for hours. Attorney Chandler C. 
Luzenberg, of New Orleans, made the opening address for the Locke bill. He called race track 
gambling “the greatest curse of Louisiana” as “the money the race track gamblers spend in New 
Orleans is taken from the people of that city.”67 Luzenberg saw the demoralizing influences of 
gambling as “it went into the homes, where the children were growing up, where it made young 
men gamblers.”68 The main problem was the “dopesters,” the men advertising around town that 
they had the inside tips and could help bet on the “sure thing.” Even if the races were legitimate 
and there was no fix, the appearance of these men did nothing to dissuade the notion that the 
sport was rigged. The Locke bill supporters also found multiple problems with the Cordill bill’s 
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establishment of a state racing commission. They argued that it would be ineffectual because, 
while it made bookmaking illegal, it set no penalty for bookmaking. The racing interests were 
fighting an uphill battle, and so long as the fight was framed as one “between the men who 
support the law and Constitution and the race-track gambler and tout,” they would be hard-
pressed to win support. 
Despite these issues, the supporters of the Cordill regulatory bill astutely identified a 
fundamental problem with the Locke bill. When it started as the anti-race track bill brought to 
Governor Sanders by the Anti-Race Track Committee, it was a direct copy of a Tennessee law. 
The Committee made one small change to it, though; they eliminated the section of the 
Tennessee law that prohibited individual betting.
69
 No rationale was apparent for why that 
provision was dropped, but given that the edit occurred during their Capital trip, it is likely that 
the committee’s discussions with the rural senators informed them that it was necessary to ensure 
rural support for the Locke bill. Racing supporter Major George Terriberry highlighted this point 
in the legislative debate, arguing that by permitting individual betting, the Locke bill “would not 
interfere with the parish fair, where everybody knows everybody else and you can place your 
money. But in New Orleans it wouldn’t work.”70 He said he believed that “individual betting was 
eliminated from the Locke bill because it was believed necessary in order to try to carry the bill 
through.”71 Advocates for the Locke bill simply ignored the criticism, as Judge Saunders did 
when he said “the Locke Bill does not prohibit individual betting, because no person who has 
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sense enough to stay out of the insane asylum would place an individual bet on horses.”72 
Luzenberg’s defense for why it permitted individual betting was merely that they “wanted to get 
at the root of the evil and not trouble ourselves with trivial matters.”73 All of these excuses set up 
a system where pari-mutuel betting was unacceptable but individual betting was tolerable, as 
explained by Luzenberg, “it left all the good [i.e. individual betting], and merely did away with 
the vice of the game [i.e. bookmaking].”74 The finest summarization of the individual betting 
question in the Locke bill was delivered by Senator Walter L. Gleason. He argued since 
Representative Locke did not think that individual betting was wrong and “the Locke bill will 
not suppress gambling,” that “when a bill purports to suppress a thing and misses it so far as this 
measure does,” it cannot be said that the subject at its heart is a “moral issue.” 75 
Lawyers for the tracks interpreted both the Locke bill and the Hunsicker Poolroom bill as 
prohibiting bookmaking operations and the French pari-mutuel system, but not “the making and 
recording of bets between individuals.”76 The “oral betting” or “individual betting” system 
required the bettor to write on a slip of paper the name of the horse, the order of finish, and the 
odds (provided orally by the bookie). The bettor then signed his name, before handing the paper 
and bet to the “oralizer,” the term that bookies went by once oral betting was the only method of 
                                                 
72
 Ibid. 
 
73
 “The Race Track Issue Up To The Legislature,” Times-Picayune, June 2, 1908. 
 
74
 Ibid. 
 
75
 “Vote on the Locke Bill 21 to 19,” Times-Picayune, June 24, 1908. 
 
76
 “Racing Situation Grows Interesting,” Times-Picayune, August 20, 1908. 
 
106 
 
bookmaking.
77
 After the race, the bettor then found the oralizer and collected his payment if he 
won. One important reason for the defense of individual betting was its connotation with the 
antebellum style of racing and the honor believed to be characteristic of the sport. Racing was 
considered to be a legitimate sport before the entry of the bookmaker who “became a director, by 
which he was able to influence judges; as owner, he could control his jockeys.”78 The pari-
mutuels, by contrast, were viewed as machine tools invented by the gamblers; their use, or 
“technique”, as indicated by sociologist Jacques Ellul, “never observes the distinction between 
moral and immoral use…. Not even the moral conversion of the technicians could make a 
difference.”79 President Theodore Grunewald of the Citizens’ Sound Legislation League in New 
Orleans reported in 1908 that “the Locke bill don’t kill these small tracks, nor even prohibit 
gambling at them, for it allows individual betting. But it makes betting prohibitive at the two big 
city tracks because they are patronized by strangers and individual betting would therefore be 
quite impossible.”80 The smaller tracks were more popular with local citizens than the New 
Orleans tracks, which attracted thousands of visitors since New Orleans was known as the winter 
home of racing. Though the religious reformers who came to the state capitol did not seem to 
take issue with the continuation of horse racing at the small tracks, at least one evangelist did. 
Georgia evangelist Sam Jones often spoke out against the sport, claiming that “the 
straightest road and the quickest time that is made to hell is on the race course with a blooded 
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horse under you.”81 He denounced the reliance of the agricultural fair on the horse track, calling 
it the “principal attraction” that drew a “debauched, disreputable crowd” to the fair.82 Historian 
Ted Ownby’s discussion of the growth of horse racing at the country and state fairs, calls it a 
“more traditional form of disreputable recreation.”83 However, Ownby mischaracterizes the 
context for the growth of rural horse racing at the fairs. He argues that “by organizing traditional 
events into large spectator affairs and by creating a setting for gambling, the fairs offered new 
opportunities for what was widely considered disreputable conduct,” but these were not 
necessarily new opportunities, nor were the spectators all of the rural populace he mentioned.
 84
  
Horse racing at the county and parish fair was generally a smaller affair throughout the late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century. It was a horse racing “frontier” with minimal 
regulation and lesser quality horses. When evangelist Sam Jones preached against the race 
courses at the county fair in 1912, asking “where will you find a more debauched, disreputable 
crowd?,” most states had already outlawed race track gambling, ending the reign of the urban 
commercial track that could not sustain itself without gambling.
85
 The explosive growth of the 
race course at the country fair coincided with the prohibition of urban gambling, as the less 
formal nature of the fair tracks and the smaller crowds allowed for different means of gambling, 
very similar to the antebellum standard. This form of oral betting was characterized by bets made 
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between two people. The smaller crowds at the fair meant that it was less likely for someone to 
walk out on a lost bet than it would be at the massive urban track which was patronized by 
numerous tourists. The New Orleans jockey clubs began to investigate this Locke oral betting 
loophole, in case the final vote did not go their way. 
On June 10, 1908, by a vote of 87 to 20, the Locke anti-racing bill overwhelmingly 
passed the Louisiana House of Representatives.
86
 Supporters of the Locke bill immediately 
announced that they had twenty-six Senators on their side, whereas only twenty-one votes were 
necessary to pass the bill.
87
 The Senate passed the Locke anti-racing bill, 21 to 19, though not 
without conflict.
88
 On the scheduled evening of the vote, the Locke faction realized they were 
two votes short when one senator became ill and the other missed his morning train from 
Livingston Parish. The other Locke supporters began to filibuster, awaiting the return of the two 
men. When they failed to arrive, the anti-racing bloc motioned to adjourn, hoping the men would 
attend when the Senate reconvened the next day. Two Senators were ill, yet dragged themselves 
from their sickbeds to vote in favor of the bill. The “dishonorable” tactics of the bill’s opponents 
were called out, as the racing supporters “spent an hour or more talking in hopes of tiring those 
Senators, believing they would be too sick to remain in their seats.”89 The presumed 
skullduggery of the turfmen was alluded to yet again, as friends of Senator S. J. Smart of De 
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Soto claimed that he had been poisoned by some type of knockout drug given to him by racing 
supporters.
90
 One anecdotal story posits that it was thanks to one man that the Locke bill passed 
– Archbishop Blenk of New Orleans. The report claims that Senator Robert O’Connor of Orleans 
Parish was in the pocket of the New Orleans machine, and he told Archbishop Blenk that if he 
were to vote for the bill, it “would mean political annihilation.”91 An hour before the final vote, 
Archbishop Blenk called up Senator O’Connor and said only “O’Connor, you must vote for the 
Locke bill.” This call in some way changed the senator’s opinion, and he voted for the bill, 
giving it a two-vote victory instead of tying the vote at 20 apiece.
92
 Even if this is merely a news 
story to demonstrate Blenk’s influence as the Prohibition fight geared up, it is demonstrative of 
the coalitions that formed between moral reformers and government officials.
93
 Louisiana thus 
was one of four states that had completely abolished racing by 1909, the others being California, 
Tennessee, and Arkansas. By January 1, 1911, Florida had joined the list of states banning race-
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track gambling so that the only states allowing race track gambling were Maryland, Oklahoma, 
Montana, Kentucky, Virginia, and Utah.
94
  
The metaphorical thoroughbred of the New Orleans gamblers had fallen and broken its 
leg coming down the homestretch, but the gamblers were not ready to give up just yet. After the 
Locke bill was passed, but before it took effect, the New Orleans Fair Grounds inaugurated a 
twenty-one-day race meeting, allowing for open gambling with full races of twelve horses up 
until the day the track was forced to shut down.
95
 The track owners had planned to run the track 
one day beyond when the Locke bill went into effect, so as to make a test case in the courts and 
receive a definition of “individual betting.” The meaning of “individual betting” was not defined 
in the law, and it was hoped that the test case would force the Supreme Court to define it. The 
track owners, though, began to fear that the Supreme Court would throw their case out of court 
due to issues of ripeness and justiciability as summer racing had not been a staple of the New 
Orleans tracks. If the case were brought to the court during the winter when racing was normally 
held, it was felt that the public would be more sympathetic to the tracks. The jockeys took the 
cancellation of the summer series especially hard. They had “dreamed… of nice fat purses and a 
chance to make enough money to get away to some fairer clime, where horseracing flourishes 
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and the bookmaker waxes fat.”96 The New Orleans Jockey Club opened up a one day meeting on 
December 16, 1908, at the City Park race track with “the object being simply to secure a square 
test in the courts of the Locke law.”97 Samuel F. Heaslip and Edward Corrigan, another 
stockholder in the Jockey Club were both arrested that day, in addition to two major bookmakers 
and the manager of the meet.
98
 They were all found guilty and paid fines, but were given 
clemency by the governor and spared serving prison sentences.
99
  
One significant effect of the Locke law can be seen in the arrests of turfmen and 
bookmakers in New Orleans. When Heaslip and Corrigan were arrested, the first bookmaker to 
be arrested with them for violating the Locke law was an Italian named Placide Frigerio. Based 
on the records of the Criminal District Court in Orleans Parish, many of the bookies arrested for 
betting violations were Italian. The nativist fears and anti-Italian sentiment among the New 
Orleans police force can be discerned in the disproportionate arrests of Italian men. The police 
discrimination can be partially derived from the murder of New Orleans Police Chief David 
Hennessey in 1890. Hennessey’s reputation for prosecuting Sicilian criminals led to the spread of 
rumors that Hennessey was assassinated by Italian Mafiosi. A hasty sweep of the city, under the 
direction of Mayor Shakespeare, to “arrest every Italian you come across,” ended in the arrests of 
                                                 
96
 “No Summer Racing at the Big Tracks Here,” Times-Picayune, July 1, 1908. 
 
97
 “City Park Race Track Will Test Locke Anti-Racing Bill,” The Lexington Herald, December 
16, 1908. 
 
98
 “Defendants Index, (1880-1918)”, Criminal District Court (Orleans Parish), City Archives, 
New Orleans Public Library. http://nutrias.org/~nopl/inv/crdcindex/crdcindex.htm. 
 
99
 “Merchants’ Jockey Club Formed for Winter Race Meet Here,” Times-Picayune, August 17, 
1910. 
 
112 
 
forty-five people within the day.
100
 The populace of New Orleans was overcome by nativist 
anxieties, and the jury acquittal of the men tried for the murder did nothing to assuage the public. 
A mob of over a thousand citizens marched on the parish prison where the defendants were being 
held, crying out to “hang the dago murderers,” before storming the grounds and lynching all 
eleven Italian prisoners.”101 The same sentiment can be seen on the turf at Hyland Park, one of 
the half-mile tracks, when Leo H. Marrero Jr., president of the New Orleans Trotting and 
Breeders’ Association and son of Sheriff Marrero, pulled out his gun to kill Italian gambler Tony 
Mendola, who was fighting a bookmaker after a dispute regarding a poor start in a race.
102
 Even 
when many of the Locke law arrests were being overturned by the courts, the New Orleans 
police, according to extant records, appeared to continue arresting primarily Italian bookmakers 
for violations. 
To prevent arrest and fines, the New Orleans turfmen and professional gamblers 
attempted to conform to the letter of the law, but they did not give up the fight completely. The 
New Louisiana Jockey Club ended their association with the Fair Grounds track at the close of 
the 1908 season, giving a five-year lease to the Business Men’s Racing Association (BMRA).103 
To try and sustain interest, the BMRA held several large race meetings, that is, series of races, 
throughout the winter and spring instead of a full racing season, using gate fees to partially offset 
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costs. The association believed that the resumption of organized racing would attract many 
tourists back to the city. The traffic manager of the Louisville and Nashville railroad offered 
passenger numbers to endorse that belief, adding that while the general attractions of New 
Orleans would make the city the biggest winter destination, he believed the principal draw was 
winter racing.
104
 The relatively small size of the purses at the Fair Grounds would likely not be 
enough to attract the best racers, many of whom were racing in Canada, Mexico, and Cuba 
following the prohibition of gambling in even more states. The BMRA felt they needed to allow 
major concessions to attract the right crowd of horsemen, deciding to forego stall rent and 
licensing fees for trainers and valets. But their greatest initiative to grow interest was the re-
establishment of “ladies’ days,” when women were admitted free of charge, to return “a social 
aspect … that [racing] has not attained since the days of the old Metairie race course.”105 If there 
was to be betting at these racing, it was informal and oral, between two people as in the days of 
the antebellum sport. By referencing the amateur antebellum turf through the Metairie race 
course and the ideal “gentlemanly” oral betting, the BMRA hoped to alleviate the anxieties of the 
public, fearful of the perceived corruption that followed the professional turfmen into the sport. 
The engagement of the honorable track judge Joseph A. Murphy for the 1916 races was another 
tactic in these public assurances. Murphy personally pledged to weed out the “objectionable 
element” in the sport.106 Murphy believed that “there is not the slightest doubt that the Locke bill 
permits some form of betting,” and expressed his hope that once that form is determined the 
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racing association could “shape [its] business to conform to the law.”107 The test cases sent to the 
Louisiana judicial system were the first step in the attempt to determine what form of betting the 
laws permitted. 
The second step in the turfmen and gamblers’ plan to distinguish a legal betting style was 
effected through new allies in the state legislature. Since the Locke Law went into effect, there 
had been talk during each legislative session about introducing a new bill to amend that law and 
regulate the sport. In 1914, State Representative E.J. Reinhardt submitted a racing bill that would 
amend the Locke Law and allow “cities of 50,000 to vote whether they shall have racing under 
State Commission supervision.”108 Though it was not initially taken seriously by the legislature, 
the racing interests candidly considered this their best chance to restore an orderly system of turf 
gambling. As they grew more vocal regarding the bill to restore pari-mutuel betting, they aroused 
the anger of anti-racing interest groups, provoking a coalition of women’s organizations and 
religious leaders to overrun the Capitol in opposition.
 109
 The New Orleans women announced 
their plans to boycott any and all businesses run by the supporters of the Reinhardt bill.
110
 The 
gambling coalition took advantage of a simultaneous measure to move the state capital to 
Alexandria. There had been numerous attempts to move the state capital after the establishment 
of Baton Rouge as the capital, using the “threat of removing the capital” as “a bargaining chip 
for causes proposed by any delegation,” but this proposal was stronger than the rest.111 Boasting 
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a new hotel, rail system, as well as a location in the center of the state, the delegates from 
Alexandria tried to woo the legislators with a free building site and a half-million dollars for 
construction. It was reported that the New Orleans gambling interests sought an alliance with the 
delegates from Alexandria in order to get back at the legislators in Baton Rouge who had 
curtailed their livelihood. The New Orleans legislators were horse-trading with the delegation 
from Alexandria, bartering votes to move the capital to Alexandria if the Alexandrians would 
support the racing bill. Unfortunately for the racing interests, though, the state capital bill was the 
first to reach the floor of the House of Representatives, where it was defeated by a vote of 60 to 
45.
112
 When the Reinhardt racing bill reached the floor only hours later, the House voted to 
indefinitely postpone it by a vote of 55 to 50, the equivalent of killing it outright.
113
 Had the 
order of the votes been reversed, it is possible that the Reinhardt bill would have passed through 
the House, though it would have still had to pass through the Senate and be signed into law by 
Governor Luther Hall. This defeat was the closest the racing interests came to receiving 
legislative gambling reauthorization during the decade. 
Another effort to establish a state racing commission came to the legislature in the 
summer of 1916 through a bill sponsored by Representatives Dan Ashford of Tensas Parish and 
Edward J. Schaff of New Orleans. This bill was primarily a revival of the Cordill bill of 1908, 
with some modifications to appease anti-racing forces. The Ashford-Schaff bill would allow the 
governor to appoint a three-member commission to license racing associations and races. To 
prevent corruption, the appointees could not own stock in a corporation for racing or breeding 
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horses, nor could any two commission members belong to the same racing association.
114
 Local 
interests were protected by requiring the commission members to have lived in Louisiana for at 
least ten years, as well as requiring all track employees to be Louisiana residents.
115
 To protect 
the youth of the city, unaccompanied minors would be prohibited from attending horse races. 
Sabbatarian values would be upheld through the prohibition of Sunday racing. Finally, just like 
the Cordill bill, this racing bill would kill the small tracks in Jefferson and St. Bernard Parishes 
by refusing a license to “tracks of less than one mile in circumference within twenty-five miles 
of any city in this state of more than 100,000 population.”116 The bill’s proponents argued that 
they simply wanted to regulate the condition of betting that already existed, and the Ashford-
Schaff bill would exist concurrently with the Locke law, merely amending the section on devices 
to allow pari-mutuel machines. Leading the crusade against this bill was the perennial opponent 
of New Orleans racing, progressive reformer Jean Gordon.
117
 Giving voice to women across the 
state, Gordon said that while the men of the city may support racing, “the mothers and women of 
this state don’t and they are going to speak in no uncertain terms.”118 Gordon’s speech during the 
hearing to bring the bill to the floor was the extent of the anti-racing advocacy, as no other 
speakers had come to the House to debate the bill. She had not come specifically to oppose it, as 
she was only in Baton Rouge to support a women’s suffrage bill that had been defeated the 
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previous day.
119
 In many respects, this is representative of the waning interest of anti-gambling 
activists. They still supported bans on gambling, but as women’s suffrage and prohibition started 
to receive greater interest, the limited energies of the reformers shifted to these causes. When the 
House vote came up for the Ashford-Schaff racing bill, it was summarily defeated by a vote of 
47 to 53 “without a touch of excitement and no debate.”120 While the Legislature was still 
inclined to prohibit a regulated system of race track gambling, the votes were moving closer to 
acceptance, much closer than the 87 to 20 vote for the Locke bill and similar to the 55 to 50 vote 
against the Reinhardt bill, though, with less activism. 
Despite the legislative setbacks, the New Orleans racing men still undertook efforts to 
develop a system of gambling that worked within the letter of the law. By 1915, the jockey clubs 
were able to institute a system of oral betting at the New Orleans Fair Grounds that skirted the 
brink of legality. The oralizers working at the Fair Grounds were still occasionally liable to be 
arrested, but they were not punished severely should they ever be prosecuted and found guilty. 
Two important cases regarding the legality of oral betting came before the Supreme Court in the 
ensuing years. The first case was State v. Austin, decided in November 1917. After Edwin Austin 
was convicted under the Locke Law for “orally operating a betting book” he appealed to the 
courts to challenge the application of the law. The lower court had ruled that Austin was not 
using a “device” per the Locke law, so when the State appealed the decision, “that question of 
law was not before the Supreme Court for decision,” and the decision would not affect the 
overall legality of the Locke law.
121
 Supreme Court Justice Walter B. Sommerville’s opinion 
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demonstrated how betting occured at the track in the Court’s interpretation. He argued that “the 
[Locke] act does not seek to punish gambling on horse racing between individuals who bet with 
the bookmaker or his assistants, or those who bet between themselves. The law refers to the 
professional gambler, the bookmaker, and his assistants who operating a betting book.”122 While 
Austin was operating within the letter of the law since he was “not operating a betting book on a 
horse race, as that term was understood at the time of the passage of Act No. 57 of 1908,” he 
violated the spirit of the law. It was the “intention of the Legislature… to punish the professional 
gambler who operated on race tracks by betting on horse races, and not the bettors who made the 
bets.”123 Nonetheless, using the strict literal reading that had been applied in the Hunsicker 
poolroom cases, the Court held that oral bookmaking – a misnomer as identified by Justice 
Charles O’Niell in his concurrence – did not fall within the meaning of the Locke law and the 
prior judgments should be annulled and reversed.
 124
 
Even after this ruling, the police still harassed some bookmakers, leaving it to the courts 
to determine the legality of their arrests based on the circumstances of the betting arrangement. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court would uphold the State v. Austin decision in a similar case, State 
v. Gardner, announced in May 1922. This case effectively repealed the Locke law and ruled that 
oral betting was legal and allowed to continue in New Orleans. In its decision, the Supreme 
Court argued that the word “device” in the law is problematic as a broad reading of the letter of 
the law would ensnare many people “who now have no thought or conception that their acts are 
unlawful, and whose number can be limited only at the will and according to the opinion of 
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juries and judges, as to who should and who should not be punished under the statute,” a 
situation that was occurring even after the decision in State v. Austin.
125
 The Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s opinion, as written by Associate Justice John St. Paul, argued that the letter of the law 
was unnecessarily broad enough to overreach the spirit of the law. As such, oral bookmaking 
does not constitute “other devices” as defined by the Locke law and gambling in Louisiana could 
continue under the oral betting system.
126
 The path to pari-mutuel acceptance remained slow 
however. Another Supreme Court decision in Talbot v. Truxillo in 1925 saw the court uphold a 
“co-operative” system, which was essentially pari-mutuel betting without any mechanical 
devices. It was believed that this would “purify the manner of gambling on horse racing by 
eliminating the bookmakers who have been euphemistically termed ‘oralizers’” who were taking 
advantage of legal loopholes.
127
 By the end of the decade, the state legislature reauthorized the 
use of pari-mutuel machines, completing the repeal of the Locke law.
128
 
Though there were some token races during the years the Locke law remained in effect, it 
was not until 1918 that regular horse racing returned to New Orleans, coming back from an 
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effective ten year hiatus.
129
 Unable to sustain membership and racing needs, the Jockey Clubs 
had disbanded, and the Business Men’s Racing Association attracted the scattered club members 
under a united umbrella.
130
 This new association did not just include the traditional turfmen, but 
claimed to represent the greater commercial interests of New Orleans, including hoteliers, 
restauranteurs, and shop owners.
131
 When a new syndicate arose in 1916 and attempted to revive 
the City Park track, the BMRA sought to buy them out, viewing the gambling focus of the 
syndicate as detrimental to their progress in winning back public support for racing. This 
progress was extremely slow, however, and the lack of demand for racing during the lean years 
destroyed the competition between the Fair Grounds and City Park, leading to the closure of the 
City Park track. By 1920, all that remained in the Crescent City was the track at the New Orleans 
Fair Grounds. The Fair Grounds Association purchased the City Park land, and after 
appropriating the grandstand from the defunct course, donated the land to the city.
132
 The transfer 
of the grandstand symbolically unified the New Orleans tracks and racing associations that had 
long been at odds. With a united organization at the helm of the sport, there was hope for another 
revival of New Orleans racing. But it was too late for the sport of kings. Though turfmen would 
publish reports referring to the continued success of the Fair Grounds track, demand for horse 
racing had reached unprecedented lows as the citizens of New Orleans had moved on to other 
spectator sports, like baseball, that reflected the changing values in society. While the New 
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Orleans turf association achieved success in the “search for order,” the process of 
bureaucratization as identified by Robert Wiebe involved a “fundamental shift in values… 
[stressing] efficiency, continuity, systematic controls, and group action.”133 Horse racing no 
longer spoke to the desires of the citizens of New Orleans.  
As control over the New Orleans turf was being contested at the turn of the twentieth 
century, reform forces seized upon claims of corruption and deceit. They received a public 
mandate to reign in the excesses of the sport. Instead of a system of internal reform through the 
jockey clubs, external reform from the arena of state politics was almost inevitable because of 
the extent to which the racing interests were united with civic authorities in the city. Despite the 
settlement of the racial issue through the exclusion of black jockeys and trainers, the assault on 
race track gambling was amplified by progressive and moral reformers. Tying together concepts 
of morality with race relations and social order, evangelicals objected to “any recreations – 
gambling, for example, or drunkenness – that threatened the home with the roughness and near-
savagery associated with black culture.”134 There was a strong desire to return to the antebellum 
form of racing that emphasized honor culture through individual betting as a means to restore 
class order in society, casting out the bookmakers and professional sportsmen. The expansion 
from controlling the morality of the home to political action was best characterized by a speaker 
at a Louisiana agricultural fair in 1907 who said “the State is only the home on a larger scale.”135 
These moral reformers enlisted representatives in the Louisiana government to pass legislation 
                                                 
133
 Louis Galambos, “The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History,” 
Business History Review 44, no. 3 (Autumn 1970): 288. 
 
134
 Ownby, 17. 
 
135
 Sallie Colvin, in Louisiana Department of Agriculture, Farmers Institute Report, 1907, 15.; 
Quoted in Ownby, 182. 
122 
 
prohibiting race track gambling. One fatal flaw in the legislation led to its varied interpretation 
among three arenas of law and order: the legislature, who created the law; the police, who 
enforced the law; and the courts, who provided the final interpretation of the law. The failure of 
these three bodies to consistently deliver a united message on the Locke law left the status of 
race track gambling in limbo for almost a decade – a position the jockey clubs hoped to avoid 
when they supported earlier efforts at reform legislation. Though the racing interests would put 
forth a compelling case for regulation – and they would continue to do so throughout the years of 
prohibition – they ran out of steam coming down the homestretch, ceding victory to the Locke 
law and the culture of control. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The race track’s powerful societal influence had all but disappeared by 1920. The 
changes regarding race relations, class conflict, and religious reform had all reached a 
consolidated consensus after World War I. The entrenchment of Jim Crow in New Orleans gave 
legal sanction to segregation laws that applied to all areas of society, including streetcars, hotels, 
restaurants, schools, and sporting entertainment. These laws “had little to do with altering the 
existing behavior of most blacks and whites in New Orleans,” argues historian Donald DeVore. 
Instead, “they represented the ideological statement of a dominant group.”1 African-Americans 
did not completely disappear from the turf, but those who remained were no longer in highly 
visible positions, staying on in servile positions like that of trainer or groom.
2
 They were also 
mainly found on smaller tracks with local racers.
3
 There were no more Isaac Murphys wielding 
“Black Cool,” or other champions of hope like him on the track. Journalist Evan Narcisse argues 
that Black Cool is not an end, but rather “a means to one. It’s a coping mechanism for existing in 
a world that’s denigrated and dehumanized you. It’s a way to freeze off the small slights and 
mega-disenfranchisements.”4 Seeing no hope in the world of the turf, “the collective dreams and 
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aspirations of African Americans had been transformed into a nightmare” they were 
disfranchised in the 1892 Constitution and lynch law was imposed on Louisiana society.
5
 
The power shift in Louisiana after the Civil War supplanted the planter aristocracy with a 
new professional class, among which could be found the sportsman. After the dissolution of the 
New Louisiana Jockey Club, control of the New Orleans tracks fell solely to the professional 
sportsmen and gamblers. The ambitions of the New South were initiated within the racing world 
by some members of the planter aristocracy who sought to restore the former glory of New 
Orleans racing. These objectives were only realized, however, through the later efforts of the 
professional sportsmen who divorced the sport from its antebellum honor, instead wedding it to 
progress and democratization. They capitalized on a culture of chance, one that grew out of “a 
consumer culture [that] encouraged many middle-class men, faced with lowered career 
expectations, to find identity in leisure instead of in work.”6 By 1920 though, horse racing 
remained solidly in the hands of professional sportsmen and gamblers. 
Opposing the culture of chance, of which “gambling remained a powerful metaphor for 
everyday life,” was the “culture of control.”7 Hostile toward the unrestrained economic forces in 
the nation, the people who favored control clung to a worldview of “evangelical rationality,” that 
considered gambling to be part of a greater struggle for civilization, manhood, and 
enlightenment.
8
 These religious and moral reformers set their sights on enacting national 
prohibition, encouraged by the success of anti-gambling laws that swept through most states. 
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They achieved victory when Congress passed the Volstead Act in October 1919, providing 
enforcement power for the Eighteenth Amendment establishment of Prohibition. By January 
1920, the United States was legally declared to be “dry.” The emerging consensus around racial 
hierarchies, the social class in control of the sport, and the moral reformers on legislating sin also 
had its counterpart in the New Orleans turf. Despite years of competition between the Metairie 
Park clubs, the City Park clubs, and the Fair Grounds clubs, when City Park closed in 1915, it 
left the Fair Grounds as the only remaining horse track in the city. The Fair Grounds reinforced 
the unification symbolically by replacing their grandstand that was destroyed in a 1919 fire with 
the former grandstand from City Park.  
By 1920, many states allowed race-tracks to reopen with certain restrictions on gambling 
methods.
9
 Some of the legendary tracks of yesteryear remained shuttered, however, as their 
jockey clubs had disbanded during the gambling prohibition or they could not afford the costs of 
restarting a horse track. The reduction in the number of tracks also reflected the decrease in 
public demand for the sport. The American public instead found itself drawn to the ball park, and 
organized baseball began its golden age.
10
 The success of baseball came from its accessibility to 
the urban experience. Baseball appealed to the urban masses and it demonstrated the same 
qualities of efficiency and excellence that served as “keys to success in industrial America.”11 
Historian Frederic Paxson explains the success of baseball over horse racing and boxing in its 
                                                 
9
 Those states that did not yet allow pari-mutuel gambling would authorize it during the Great 
Depression, with the hope of taxing any revenue. Michael Nelson and John Lyman Mason, How the South 
Joined the Gambling Nation: The Politics of State Policy Innovation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2007), 3. 
 
10
 For more on the rise of organized baseball, see Harold Seymour, Baseball. Vol. 2: The Golden 
Age. 3 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).  
 
11
 Gunther Barth, City People: The Rise of Modern City Culture in Nineteenth-Century America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 180. 
126 
 
ability to “[turn] the city lot into a playground and the small boy into an enthusiastic player.”12 
Baseball displaced horse racing because it was a better fit for the American urban environment 
and it had lower barriers to entry for participation.
13
 
Racing by the mid-twentieth century had long passed its peak as a popular sport among 
the general public. People might have still followed the Kentucky Derby or the Preakness when 
they were run, but the crowds that thronged at the Fair Grounds would never again reach the 
heights they did in the 1880s and 1890s. But just as the businessmen of the Gilded Age and 
Progressive Era still considered the sport a means of achieving and maintaining social status, that 
popular conception remained throughout the twentieth century. Racing was again a sport for the 
rich, as Belmont insisted, but in Louisiana, the sport attracted mostly the nouveaux riche and 
very few of the well-born. Since the incorporation of gambling as a systemic institution at the 
race tracks, the rhetoric of horse racing has had a dichotomous nature. Horse racing is 
simultaneously high-culture and low-brow, depending on whether one discusses gambling when 
talking horses. Louisiana Governor Huey Long provides an excellent example of this rhetoric. At 
the prime of his career, as Long prepared to enter yet another slimy, mud-slinging political 
brawl, he gleefully remarked to a friend that politics “is the sport of kings.”14 Long’s statement, 
referring to the elite nature of politics and the vulgar tactics of demagoguery, demonstrates that 
the rhetoric of horse racing still had meaning to the people of Louisiana. 
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This rhetoric is best evidenced through two Louisiana politicians: Earl Long and 
deLesseps “Chep” Morrison. Huey’s brother, Governor Earl Long, was an avid horse racing 
aficionado. One acquaintance characterized Earl as “tight with his money. The one thing he’s 
never been tight about is horse betting. He can’t stop.”15 After his release from a mental hospital, 
Earl “departed on a long tour of recuperation at out-of-state Western race tracks that most of the 
lay public had never heard of before he hit them,” ending up in Hot Springs in Arkansas, “a 
resort famous for reconditioning old prize fighters and race horses."
16
 Whereas track gambling 
was seen as an amusing characteristic of “Uncle Earl,” it was used to allege corruption and 
disorder in the administration of New Orleans Mayor “Chep” Morrison. An opponent of 
Morrison’s administration, Eighth Ward Representative C. Fred Donaldson, alleged that the city 
was on the verge of bankruptcy under Morrison’s watch. Donaldson “contended that the mayor 
telephoned the Fair Grounds racetrack each night during the racing season to learn what the 
municipal share of the track receipts would be for that day. Morrison then used this knowledge to 
determine city operating expenses for the next day."
17
 Donaldson’s story is unlikely to be true, 
yet it emphasizes that the race track was not only an important source of revenue for the city, but 
also an institution about which the public held strong opinions. Morrison also provides an 
excellent example of the deeper motives that underwrite moral arguments. He wrote a letter to 
Governor Robert Kennon in 1953, pleading for the governor to prevent night racing in the 
metropolitan district. Morrison contended that “a dual racing season would injure department 
stores, groceries, and other businesses in the area and that night racing was an evil which preyed 
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largely upon the poor man who worked during the day and went to the track at night.”18 At the 
root of the issue though, was the fact that the proposed night track would have been in Jefferson 
Parish, and should it be permitted to run, tax revenue from that track would benefit Jefferson 
Parish, not Orleans Parish and New Orleans. Even in the 1950s, arguments over the New Orleans 
race tracks continued to focus on morality as a means of hiding the reality of self-interest. 
Louisiana currently has four race tracks that offer live horse racing – Louisiana Downs in 
Bossier City; Delta Downs in Vinton; Evangeline Downs in Lafayette; and the Fair Grounds in 
New Orleans. While they were important local institutions, the tracks had generally languished 
through the end of the twentieth century. After the Louisiana legislature legalized casino 
gambling in the 1990s, it struck a blow to the tracks that further threatened their stability as they 
lost many patrons to other forms of gambling.
19
 The track owners petitioned the state legislature 
to allow them to become “racinos,” citing examples of other Southern tracks saved from the 
brink of failure by creating slot machine parlors.
20
 After Governor Mike Foster signed the racino 
bill in 1997, the tracks were quickly purchased by national corporations that revitalized the local 
racing scene. Despite the resurgence of the Louisiana track, also stimulated by the national 
acclaim received by the Cajun jockeys from Bayou Country, the tracks still could not survive 
without gambling.
21
 Unlike the situation over a century ago however, it was now slots, not track 
betting, that kept the doors open. 
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APPENDIX: PARI-MUTUEL GAMBLING 
 
For further explanation of how a pari-mutuel betting pool would work, along with the 
changing odds, here is a hypothetical horse race with five participants (and a 5% commission): 
At the beginning of the day, the track handicapper, the local “expert” on predicting 
winners, estimates what the final odds will be for each horse to win. If this were a fixed-odds 
system, his role would be that of the bookie who sets the stable odds on the morning of the race. 
The handicapper’s prediction is then printed in the track program as “the morning line.” In this 
hypothetical horse race, the morning line is set as such. 
Horses Morning Line Odds Payout on a $1 Bet 
Horse A 3-to-1 $4.00 
Horse B 3-to-2 $2.50 
Horse C 30-to-1 $31.00 
Horse D 6-to-1 $7.00 
Horse E 5-to-1 $6.00 
 
As people enter the racetrack, they read the morning betting line and make a decision as 
to whether they believe its accuracy and will bet in accordance with it. Thirty minutes before 
post-time for this hypothetical race, the tote board, the sign that shows the amounts bet on each 
horse and its approximate odds to win, reads very differently from the morning line. 
Horses Total Wagered On Each Horse Odds Based on Wagers Payout on a $1 Bet 
Horse A $75 5-to-1 $6.33 
Horse B $125 3-to-1 $3.80 
Horse C $25 18-to-1 $19.00 
Horse D $200 2-to-1 $2.38 
Horse E $75 5-to-1 $6.33 
 
The odds decreased for Horses A and B, increased for Horses C and D, and stayed the 
same for Horse E. There could be any number of reasons for why the odds changed. The betting 
crowd might have thought that Horses A and B were over-rated by the handicapper, and Horses 
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C and D were under-rated. They might have seen something special in Horse D during the 
paddock parade, or noticed some sluggishness in Horses A and B. The odds on Horse C may 
have improved drastically if this were a race near the end of the day when the gamblers who lost 
money at the track were looking for one big long-shot winner to recoup their losses. 
At post-time, the betting windows close, and the odds are finalized. The final wagers and 
odds for this race read: 
Horses Total Wagered On Each Horse Odds Based on Wagers Payout on a $1 Bet 
Horse A $150 5-to-1 $6.33 
Horse B $300 2-to-1 $3.16 
Horse C $100 8-to-1 (approx.) $9.50 
Horse D $250 3-to-1 $3.80 
Horse E $200 4-to-1 $4.75 
 
The total amount of money in the wagering pool is $1000. The state/racing agency takes 
its 5% commission, leaving $950 in the pot. Assume that Horse D wins the race. The $950 is 
then awarded to those bettors who wagered on Horse D: $950 / $250 = $3.8 per $1 wagered. 
Thus, the payout would return the $1 bet and an additional $2.80 profit. Therefore, the odds for 
Horse B would be approximately 3-to-1. The pari-mutuel system can be seen as a more 
democratic one, as it removed the possibly crooked bookmaker from the scenario, who sets 
betting lines in search of his own profit, and allows the people to wager among themselves, with 
the track and/or state charging a small percentage commission for the facilitation of bets. 
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